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Abstract
Modern authentication systems store hashed values of passwords of users using cryptographic hash functions.
Therefore, to crack a password an attacker needs to guess a hash function input that is mapped to the hashed value,
as opposed to the password itself. We call a hash function that maps the same number of inputs to each bin, as
unbiased. However, cryptographic hash functions in use have not been proven to be unbiased (i.e., they may have
an unequal number of inputs mapped to different bins). A cryptographic hash function has the property that it is
computationally difficult to find an input mapped to a bin. In this work we introduce a structured notion of biased
hash functions for which we analyze the average guesswork under certain types of brute force attacks.
This work shows that the level of security depends on the set of hashed values of valid users as well as the
statistical profile of a hash function, resulting from bias. We examine the average guesswork conditioned on the
set of hashed values, and model the statistical profile through the empirical distribution of the number of inputs
that are mapped to a bin. In particular, we focus on a class of statistical profiles (capturing the bias) , which we
call type-class statistical profiles, that has an empirical distribution related to the probability of the type classes
defined in the method of types. For such profiles, we show that the average guesswork is related to basic measures
in information theory such as entropy and divergence. We use this to show that the effect of bias on the conditional
average guesswork is limited compared to other system parameters such as the number of valid users who store
their hashed passwords in the system.
Finally, we show that bias can be used to increase the average guesswork, when using a backdoor mechanism
that allows a system to efficiently modify the mappings of the hash function.
I. INTRODUCTION
A password is a means to authenticate users by allowing access only to an authorized user who knows
it. Modern systems do not store the password of a valid user in plain text but rather hash it (a many
to one mapping) and store its hashed value, which is paired with a user name. This in turn protects the
passwords of valid users when the system is compromised [1],[2]. In order to gain access to a system a
user provides the system with his user name and his password; the system then calculates its hash value
and compares it to the one it has on file.
The most prevalent method of protecting passwords is using cryptographic hash functions whose output
can be computed easily but cannot be inverted easily [3], [4], [5], [1], [2]. Essentially, cryptographic hash
functions are the “workhorses of modern cryptography” [6] and, among other things, enable systems
to protect passwords against attackers that break into their servers. In some cases such as message
authentication codes (MAC) [7] it is meaningful to consider keyed hash functions. Keyed hash functions
can be viewed as a set of hash functions, where the actual function which is used is determined by the
value assigned to the key, which is a secret [8]. A practical keyed hash function that enables the use of
off-the-shelf computationally secure hash functions, is a keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC)
[7].
Modern systems store for every user a user name along with a hash value of its password; in this paper
the set of hash values of the passwords of valid users is referred to as the set of occupied bins, which is
denoted by B. A common assumption that is usually made is that the hash functions are unbiased, that
is, every possible output of the hash function has the same number of inputs mapped to it. However, this
assumption has not been proved for cryptographic hash functions used in practice, and they can be biased.
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2In this work we define bias based on the statistical profile of a hash function, which is basically the
empirical distribution induced by the number of inputs that are mapped to every bin; in this sense bias
means that the number of inputs that are mapped to every bin changes across bins. In terms of the set of
occupied bins it means that some hash values of passwords are more vulnerable than others (unlike the
unbiased case where every element in the set of occupied bins is equally protected). Indeed, this work
addresses the question of how bias affects the level of security in terms of password cracking.
A basic type of attacks for cracking passwords are brute force attacks, where an attacker who does not
know the structure of the hash function guesses inputs one by one until it finds an input that is mapped
to an element in the set of occupied bins. We consider two brute force attacks: A remote attack where an
attacker tries to break into an account of a user by guessing an input that has the same hash value as the
hash value of the password of that user; and an insider attack, where an attacker has an insider access to
all user-names and hash values of their passwords. This enables it to compare the hashed values of his
guesses against every element in the set of occupied bins, that is, it should guess an input whose hash
value is equal to any of the elements in the set of occupied bins, to satisfy its goal of finding one valid
user-name password pair. Note that in both cases, the attacker does not know which inputs (passwords)
map to which bin, and can only check by applying the (unknown) hash function.
For brute force attacks, a meaningful measure of the level of security is guesswork. Guesswork is the
number of attempts required to successfully guess a secret. The guesswork is a random variable whose
probability mass function depends on the statistical profile according to which a secret is chosen (e.g.,
when there is bias in terms of the way the secret is drawn at random) along with the strategy used for
guessing. It was first introduced and analyzed by Massey [9] who lower bounded the average guesswork
by the Shannon entropy. Arikan showed that the rate at which any moment of the guesswork increases
is actually equal to the Renyi entropy [10], and is larger than the Shannon entropy unless the secret is
uniformly distributed in which case both are equal. Guesswork has been analyzed in many other scenarios
such as guessing up to a certain level of distortion [11], guessing under source uncertainty with and without
side information [12], [13], using guesswork to lower bound the complexity of sequential decoding [10],
guesswork for Markov chains [14], guesswork under a certain probability of failure of the attack [15],
guesswork for the Shannon cipher system [16] as well as other applications in security [17], [18], [19],
[20], [21], [22]. As far as we know there has been no systematic study of guesswork for hash functions.
A hash function is non-injective. Therefore an attacker only has to guess a password that has the same
hash value as the original password, and not necessarily the password of the user. In the presence of bias,
and under the assumption that the attacker does not know the structure of the hash function, the problem
of guesswork for cracking passwords deviates away from the classic definition of guesswork where an
attacker is trying to correctly guess the exact secret. The reason for this is that in the problem of password
cracking the attacker cannot guess bins (outputs of a hash function) directly. In fact, the attacker can only
guess inputs to the hash function, since it does not a-priori know to what bins they are mapped. Note that
for crytographic hash functions, finding the inputs corresponding to the particular bin is computationally
difficult.
In order to capture the effect of bias on hash functions under brute force attacks we define a new
concept, the conditional average guesswork conditioned on the set of occupied bins; in the presence
of bias the average guesswork may change as a function of the hash values to which passwords are
mapped. Since the conditional average guesswork may change as a function of the set of occupied bins,
we define the maximum and the minimum conditional average guesswork (i.e., find the set of occupied
bins that maximizes/minimizes the conditional average guesswork). Furthermore, we define the most likely
conditional average guesswork, which is basically the conditional average guesswork that is most likely to
occur, assuming that passwords and as a result the set of occupied bins are drawn at random. Furthermore,
we also consider the unconditional average guesswork, which is basically the average over the conditional
average guesswork.
We focus on the type-class statistical profile, where the empirical distribution is the same as the
3probability of a given type in the method of types, when the dominant type-class is p1. The first main
result of this paper studies the problem for such a class of statistical profiles using the tools from the
method of types [23]. For such a profile, when the most likely (dominant) type-class has distribution p,
with a subset of 2H(p)·m bins out of the entire set of bins (in total 2m bins when every bin is represented
by a binary string of length m), having this distribution, For such hash functions we show that the most
likely conditional average guesswork under an insider attack increases like 2(H(p)−R)·m, where H (p) is
the binary Shannon entropy, 2R·m is the number of users, 0 ≤ R ≤ H (p), and p parameterizes the bias.
Furthermore, when R < H (p) /2 the probability for the most likely conditional average guesswork goes
to 1 with m.
The expression above reveals an interesting connection between the effect of bias on the level of
security and the effect of increasing the number of users in a system. Basically, increasing the number of
users has a far worse effect in terms of average guesswork. In addition, the rate at which the conditional
average guesswork increases depends on the Shannon entropy rather than Renyi entropy [10], which is
the dominated term in classic results on guesswork. We also present a concentration result showing that
the most likely conditional average guesswork is also the most likely actual number of guesses, and also
that the event where the number of guesses reaches this average is not an atypical event (on the other
hand, in classic results on guesswork the event where the number of guesses hits the average guesswork
is an atypical event).
Furthermore, the maximum conditional average guesswork as a function of the type-class of the statisti-
cal profile increases like 2m·D(s||p), where the number of users is 2R·m = 2H(s)·m, 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1, and D (·||·)
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence, used above for Bernoulli (s) and Bernoulli (p) distributions. Note that
this function is unbounded as a function of p, that is, as p decreases and bias in the hash function increases,
the exponent of the maximum conditional average guesswork increases unboundedly. This is because the
chances of hitting the correct bin reduces when there is such a non-uniform distribution of inputs to bins.
Other than the results presented above this paper contains more results on the average guesswork under
remote and insider attacks. We present however only some of the results in the introduction for clarity.
Another question that this work addresses is whether or not bias can be used to increase the average
guesswork. It is shown in this paper that indeed bias can increase the average guesswork as long as there
is a backdoor mechanism that the system can use that enables it to map passwords of users to the least
likely bins. An efficient backdoor mechanism is presented and it is shown that under a remote attack
the average guesswork increases like 2(2H(p)+D(1−p||p)−R)·m. Note that again, the exponent of the average
guesswork increases unboundedly as p decreases (i.e., the bias increases).
Another set of results in this paper analyze the average guesswork for strongly universal hash functions
when the key according to which hash functions are chosen is biased. For the case where the binary
elements of the key are drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) it is shown that when a backdoor mechanism is in place
(similar to the one discussed above) and when considering a target average guesswork, the length of a
biased key required to achieve this target is shorter than the length of a key that is drawn uniformly (i.e.,
i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2)).
This paper presents new definitions and results on the average guesswork of hash functions. For better
understanding of the structure of the paper it is recommended to go to Section IV, which outlines the
main technical results and points to where they can be found.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section II with background and basic definitions. The
problem setting is presented in Section III, followed by overview of the results in Section IV. General
expressions are provided in Section V followed by the average guesswork of hash functions in Section
VI as well as the case where hash functions can be modified VII. The average guesswork of strongly
universal hash functions is analyzed in Section VIII. Finally, Section IX shows that a shorter biased key
can achieve the same average guesswork as a longer uniform key.
1Note that this is a special class of profiles, as the statistical profile could be arbitrary, but this special class is motivated when considering
different groups of bins in a hash function that have different bias, as also explained in Section V.
4II. BACKGROUND AND BASIC DEFINITIONS
In this section we present basic definitions and results in the literature that we use throughout the paper.
A. Guesswork
Consider the following game: Bob draws a sample x from a random variable X , and an attacker Alice
who does not know x but knows the probability mass function PX (·), tries to guess it. An oracle tells
Alice whether her guess is right or wrong.
The number of guesses it takes Alice to guess x successfully is a random variable G (X) (which
is termed guesswork) that takes only positive integer values. The optimal strategy of guessing X that
minimizes all non negative moments of G (X)
E (G (X)ρ) =
∑
x∈X
G (x)ρ · PX (x) ρ ≥ 0 (1)
is guessing elements in X based on their probabilities in descending order [9], [10], such that G (x) <
G (x′) implies pX (x) > pX (x′), i.e. a dictionary attack [24]; where G (x) is the number of guesses after
which the attacker guesses x. In this paper we analyze the optimal guesswork and therefore with slight
abuse of notations we define G (X) to be the optimal guesswork.
It has been shown that E (G (X)ρ) is dictated by the Renyi entropy [10]
H 1
1+ρ
(PX (x)) =
1
ρ
log2


(∑
x
P (x)
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ . (2)
For example, when drawing a random vector X of length k, which is independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) with distribution P = [p1, . . . , pM ], the exponential growth rate of the average guesswork
scales according to the Renyi entropy Hα (X) with parameter α = 1/2 [10]:
lim
k→∞
1
k
log2 (E (G (X))) = H1/2 (P ) = 2 · log2
(∑
i
p
1/2
i
)
(3)
where H 1
2
(P ) ≥ H (P ) = −∑x∈X p (x) log (p (x)) which is the Shannon entropy, with equality only for
the uniform probability mass function. Furthermore, for any ρ ≥ 0
lim
k→∞
1
k
log2 (E (G (X)
ρ)) = ρ ·H 1
1+ρ
(P ) . (4)
The definition of guesswork was also extended to the case where the attacker has a side information
Y available [10]. In this case the average guesswork for Y = y is defined as G (X|Y = y), and the ρth
moment of G (X|Y ) is
E (G (X|Y )ρ) =
∑
y
E (G (X|Y = y)ρ) · pY (y) . (5)
Arikan [10] has bounded the ρth moment of the optimal guesswork, G (X|Y ), by
(1 + ln (M))−ρ
∑
y
(∑
x
PX,Y (x, y)
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ
≤
E (G (X|Y )ρ) ≤
∑
y
(∑
x
PX,Y (x, y)
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ
(6)
5where M = |X| is the cardinality of X . Furthermore, in [10] it has been shown that when X and Y are
identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.), the exponential growth rate of the optimal guesswork is
lim
k→∞
1
k
log2 (E (G
∗ (X|Y )ρ)) = ρ ·H 1
1+ρ
(PX,Y (x, y)) (7)
where m is the size of X and Y , and
H 1
1+ρ
(PX,Y (x, y)) =
1
ρ
log2

∑
y
(∑
x
P (x, y)
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ (8)
is Renyi’s conditional entropy of order 1
1+ρ
[10].
B. Hash Functions and their Statistical Profile
A hash function, H (·), is a mapping from a larger domain A to a smaller range B. In this work we
assume that the input is of length n bits whereas the output is m bits long, where n > m. We term
the binary string of length m that represents the output of a hash function bin which is denoted by
b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}.
For the analysis of the average guesswork of hash functions, we define the the statistical profile of a
hash function which is a probability mass function defined over the set of bins, where each element is
defined as the relative number of inputs that are mapped to a bin. For this, we use the following definition
throughout the paper.
Definition 1 (Statistical profile of a hash function). Consider a hash function with an input of size 2n
and an output of size 2m, where n > m. The statistical profile is defined as follows
PH (b) =
1
2n
2n∑
i=1
1b (i) b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} (9)
where 1b (x) =
{
1 x = b
0 x 6= b . Thus, PH (b) is the relative number of inputs that are mapped to bin b.
Definition 2. A PH (b)-hash function is a hash function whose statistical profile is PH (b), where b ∈
{1, . . . , 2m}.
Example 1. When the relative number of inputs that are mapped to a bin is the same across all bins,
PH (b) is distributed uniformly, that is, PH (b) = 2
−m for every b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}.
Remark 1. Basically a PH (b)-hash function can be represented by a bipartite graph, where the degree
of every input is one, whereas the degree of every bin b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}, divided by 2n is PH (b). Figure 1
illustrates this.
Definition 3 (A keyed hash function). A Keyed hash function is a set of hash functions, where the actual
hash function being used is determined by the key value.
We now define a set of hash functions, consisting of hash functions that have the same statistical profile.
Definition 4 (The set of PH (b) hash functions). The PH (b)-set of hash functions is the set of all hash
functions whose statistical profile is PH (b) as given in Definition 1; that is, the number if inputs mapped
to a bin b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} is the same across all of these hash functions; the difference between these hash
functions is the actual inputs that are mapped to every bin. This can also be defined in terms of a keyed
hash function over this set, where every key value is mapped to an element in this set.
6Bins
Inputs
b¯
Figure 1. A bipartite graph representation of a hash function. In this case the statistical profile is {3/22, 3/22, 3/22, 1/22, 3/22, 3/22, 3/22}.
Remark 2. The PH (b)-set of hash functions is basically all the bipartite graph representations whose
output degrees divided by 2n give PH (b), for every b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}. Therefore, it consists of all possible
permutations of edges from inputs to bins that yield PH (b).
Definition 5 (A keyed PH (b)-hash function). A set of PH (b)-hash functions, where the actual function
is determined by the key, which chooses a permutation of the inputs.
Figure 2 illustrates the remark above.
Bins
Inputs
b¯
P
erm
utation
Figure 2. A PH (b)-set of hash functions. The outputs (right hand side) are fixed whereas each hash function is a different permutation of
the edges that go to the inputs (the left hand side).In terms of keyed hash functions it means that the key chooses a permutation (i.e., a hash
function).
C. Method of Types
In this paper we analyze the average guesswork of hash functions based on the method of types [23].
Assume a binary vector X of size m which is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p). The realization x is of type q in
7case N (1|x) /m = q where N (1|x) is the number of occurrences of the number 1 in the binary vector x.
The first result is related to the probability of drawing a type q when the underlying probability is
Bernoulli(p).
Lemma 1 ([23] Theorem 11.1.2). The probability Q (q) = P (N (1|x) /m = q) which is the probability
that x is of type q, is equal to
Q (q) = 2−m(H(q)+D(q||p)) (10)
where D (q||p) =∑i qi log (qi/pi) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence [23].
The next lemma bounds the number of elements for each type.
Lemma 2 ([23] Theorem 11.1.3). The number of elements for which N (1|x) /m = q is bounded by the
following terms
1
(m+ 1)2
· 2m·H(q) ≤ |N (1|x) = q| ≤ 2m·H(q). (11)
III. PROBLEM SETTING
In this section we define the problem, the attack model, and extend the definition of average guesswork
to the case of cracking hashed passwords.
The following definitions address the way passwords are stored in a system, and how access to a system
is granted.
Definition 6 (Hashed passwords storage method). We define the method according to which the system
stores passwords.
• There are M users registered in the system.
• In order to access the system a user provides his user name and password.
• The system does not store the passwords, but rather stores the user names and the hashed values of
the passwords.
• The system hashes the password.
Definition 7 (Authentication scheme). The following protocol grants a user access.
• The user sends its user name to the system.
• The system finds the bin value which is coupled with this user name.
• The user types a password; the system hashes the password; if the hashed value matches the bin
from the previous bullet, then access is granted.
Definition 8 (The set of occupied bins). The set of occupied bins B is the set of bins to which the
passwords of valid users are mapped, that is, these are the hash values of the passwords of valid users.
The size of the set of occupied bins |B| = 2R·m is the number of unique values in the set.
Figure 3 illustrates what the set of occupied bins B means.
Next, we define two brute-force attack models under which we analyze the average guesswork. The
first is a remote attack in which the user does not know the set of occupied bins. The second is an insider
attack in which an attacker has insider access to the system so that it can test the hash function directly
and compare the hashed values to the occupied bins.
Definition 9 (A remote attack). The following steps define a remote attack:
• The attacker does not know what the hash function is; it may know the statistical profile PH (b) given
in Definition 1, but it does not know where the inputs are mapped to, that is, in terms of Figure 2 it
does not know what permutation defines the hash function.
• The attacker does not know the passwords of the users; it also does not know the set of occupied
bins.
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Ps UN
Ps UN
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bins
Figure 3. Overall there are 2m bins out of which the passwords are mapped to a subset B, which is termed the occupied bins. Note that
UN represents user name, and Psi represents the password of user i.
• The attacker can guess the passwords one by one; it can choose any strategy for guessing the
passwords.
• The attacker chooses a user name and then guesses passwords one by one. Once the attacker guesses
a password that is mapped to the same bin as the password of the user, it has cracked the password.
This is in line with using a keyed hash function, where the attacker does not know the key.
Figure 4 presents the setting of the problem presented above.
Server
User Names
Hashed PasswordsHash FunctionPassword
User Name
Access/No Access
Figure 4. The user/attacker enters a user name and a password. The server hashes the password with a hash function, and compares its
output to the value that is stored on the server for the user name that was entered. When the values match access is granted; otherwise
access is denied.
Definition 10 (An insider attack). We make the same assumptions as in Definition 9 (in particular it still
does not know the hash function), with the exception that this time the attacker has insider access so that
it can test the hash function directly and compare the hashed values of his guesses to the elements in the
set of occupied bins, as it knows the user-name, and hashed password pairs.
• The password is cracked when the attacker finds a password that is mapped to any of the occupied
bins.
Figure 5 illustrates the difference between these two types of attacks.
We now define the average guesswork for passwords cracking.
Definition 11 (The guesswork of hash functions). The following are the two types of guesswork that we
analyze in this paper.
• The number of guesses required to find a password that is mapped to a particular bin b is Gbin (b),
where b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}.
9The password
A password
Bin UN
(a) A remote attack, where the password is
cracked when the attacker finds an input that
is mapped to the same bin as the password of
the user.
A password
Bin UN
Bin UN
Bin UN
Bin UN
(b) An insider attack where the password
is cracked when the attacker finds an input
that is mapped to any of the occupied bins,
that is, any element in B.
Figure 5. An illustration of the difference between remote and insider attacks. Note that UN represents a user-name.
• Given a set of occupied bins B, the number of guesses required to find an input that is mapped to
any element in B (rather than a particular element) is Ginsider (B).
Guesswork is a random variable, where the number of guesses depends on a certain source of ran-
domness. The following definition presents the source of randomness for the average guesswork of hash
functions given a set of occupied bins.
Definition 12 (Averaging Arguments). We define two methods for averaging the number of guesses
required to find an input that is mapped to a particular bin b (Gbin (b)) as well as to any element in
B (Ginsider (B)).
• A keyed PH (b)-hash function: For any strategy of guessing passwords one by one we average
over all hash functions whose statistical profile is PH (b) (as presented in Figure 2). We average by
assuming that a key which is uniformly distributed chooses an element form this set of hash functions.
• A PH (b)-hash function unknown to the attacker: In this case we average over all strategies of
guessing passwords one by one. We assume that every strategy of guessing is equally likely to be
chosen.
Remark 3. Averaging over all strategies for guessing passwords one by one may not be a usual way of
evaluating the level of security. In particular, this method is meaningful only when the passwords of the
users are drawn uniformly (whereas the bias lies in the statistical profile of the hash function). Indeed,
in our problem when the attacker does not know the mappings from inputs to outputs of a hash function,
and passwords are drawn uniformly, this definition makes sense and in fact achieves the same average
guesswork as a keyed hash function and any strategy of guessing passwords one by one.
Remark 4. Averaging over all strategies of guessing passwords one by one can be thought of as drawing
nonce at random at every step as an input to the hash function.
Definition 13 (The average guesswork under a remote attack). Assume that the number of users is
2R·m, where 0 ≤ R ≤ 1, as presented in Definition 8. The average guesswork under a remote attack,
E (Gremote (B)), is the average number of guesses required to find an input that is mapped to the same
bin as the password of a user, averaged over all users.
Lemma 3. The average guesswork under a remote attack for a set of occupied bins B (presented in
Definition 8) can be written as follows:
E (Gremote (B)) = 2
−R·m∑
b∈B
E (Gbin (b)) . (12)
Proof. The proof is straight forward based on Definition 13.
Definition 14 (The average guesswork under an insider attack). The average guesswork under an insider
attack for a set of occupied bins B is E (Ginsider (B)), where Ginsider (B) is presented in Definition 11.
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Remark 5. Note that Ginsider (B) can be viewed as an extension of Gbin (b) to the case where a password
has to hit a “super” bin which is the set of occupied bins.
Remark 6. Note that Ginsider (B) and Gremote (B) are a function of the set of occupied bins B. Basically
it means that as B changes their underlying probability mass function as well as their average change
too.
The next definitions address the fact that the average guesswork is a function of the set of occupied
bins B.
Definition 15 (The maximum and minimum conditional average guesswork). Given that the set of occupied
bins is of size |B|, the minimum and maximum conditional average guesswork, conditioned on the set of
occupied bins, are defined as follows:
• The maximum conditional average guesswork is the maximum average number of guesses required
to break into the system under a remote or an insider attack, where the maximum is taken over all
sets of occupied bins of size |B|.
• The minimum conditional average guesswork is the minimum number of guesses required to break
into the system under a remote or an insider attack, where the minimum is taken over all sets of
occupied bins of size |B|.
Lemma 4 (The maximum and minimum conditional average guesswork). The maximum and minimum
conditional average guesswork under a remote (insider) attack when the size of the set of occupied bins
is A can be written as follows:
max
{B:|B|=A}
E
(
Gremote(insider) (B)
)
, (13)
and
min
{B:|B|=A}
E
(
Gremote(insider) (B)
)
, (14)
where averaging is done according to Definition 12.
Proof. The proof is straight forward based on Definition 15.
Remark 7. In order to achieve the maximum/minimum average guesswork the users have to draw
passwords that are mapped to the set of occupied bins that maximizes/minimizes equation (13)/ (14).
The probability for this event can be very low.
Remark 8 (The set of occupied bins the maximizes/minimizes that conditional average guesswork). When
averaging over a keyed PH (b)-hash function, for every element in this set of hash functions, users draw
passwords that are mapped to the set of occupied bins that maximizes/minimizes equation (13)/ (14).
Definition 16 (The most likely conditional average guesswork). Given that the set of occupied bins is of
size |B|, the most likely conditional average guesswork under a remote/insider attack is the most likely
average number of guesses required to break into the system assuming that passwords are drawn at
random according to a certain probability mass function.
Lemma 5 (The most likely conditional average guesswork). The most likely conditional average guesswork
is
argmax
a≥0
∑
B0:E(Gremote/insider(B0))=a,|B0|=A
Pr{B} (B0) (15)
when averaging the guesswork according to definition 12, and passwords are drawn at random according
to a probability mass function that induces Pr{B} (B0), which is the probability that passwords are mapped
to a set of occupied bins B0.
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Proof. Basically the conditional average guesswork is a function of the set of occupied bins B. Further-
more, certain sets of occupied bins can have the same conditional average guesswork. Therefore, it is a
question of what is the most probable group (or set) of sets of occupied bins whose guesswork is the
same. This leads to equation (15).
Figure 6 illustrates the concept of the most likely average guesswork.
b1
b2
b
B1
b
b
b
b
2m
bins
b1
b2
b
B3
b1
b2
b
B2
Figure 6. Assume that B1, B2, and B3 are the only sets of occupied bins whose average guesswork is E
(
Gremote/insider (B1)
)
=
E
(
Gremote/insider (B2)
)
= E
(
Gremote/insider (B3)
)
= a, and also that |B1| = |B2| = |B3| = A. In this case when pr{B} (B1) +
pr{B} (B2) + pr{B} (B3) is maximum compared to all other groups of occupied bins of size A that have the same average guesswork (not
a), than the most likely average guesswork is a and the probability of this guesswork is pr{B} (B1) + pr{B} (B2) + pr{B} (B3).
Definition 17 (The average guesswork over all sets of occupied bins). The average guesswork over all sets
of occupied bins is averaging E
(
Gremote/insider (B)
)
over all possible sets of occupied bins B through
Pr{B} (B). We denote this by E (GP (B)).
Lemma 6 (The average guesswork over the sets of all occupied bins). The average guesswork over all
sets of occupied bins under a remote/insider attacks, when the average for every set of occupied bins is
done according to Definition 12 is
E (GP (B)) =
∑
B
E
(
Gremote/insider (B)
) · Pr{B} (B) . (16)
Proof. The proof is straight forward based on Definition 17.
Remark 9. E
(
Gremote/insider (B)
)
can be viewed as the conditional average guesswork conditioned on
the set of occupied bins B, whereas E (GP (B)) can be viewed as the average over the conditional
average, that is, the average guesswork when averaging over all sets of occupied bins.
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS
In this section we outline the main results presented in the paper and reference the relevant theorems
and definitions in the paper, so that the motivation and the essence of the results can stand out.
A. Hashing Passwords, Brute Force Attacks, and Bias
Modern systems do not store the passwords of their users in plain text but rather hash them (a many
to one mapping) and store their hash value, which is paired with a user name, as described in Figure 4
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and presented in Definition 7. This in turn protects the users passwords when the system is compromised.
In order to gain access to a system a user provides the system with his user name and his password; the
system then calculates its hash value and compares it to the one stored in the system.
The set of bins to which the passwords of the users are mapped is termed the set of occupied bins
and denoted by B. This is presented in Definition 8 and Figure 3.
In a brute force attack an adversary who does not know the structure of the hash function, and
therefore does not know which inputs map to which bins, guesses inputs one by one in order to find an
input that is mapped to an element in B (one of the hash values stored in the system), that is, a hash
value of a password of a valid user. This sort of attacks deviate away from classic works on guesswork,
which consider attacks where an attacker has to find the password of a user (go to Subsection II-A for
background on classic guesswork). The reason for this is that in password cracking the attacker does not
know the hash function and so cannot directly guess specific bin values, but rather guess inputs, and it
does not know to what outputs they are mapped. Indeed, in Theorem 14 we analyze the case where the
attacker does know the hash function and also therefore knows the inputs mapping to each bin, thereby it
can guess bins directly (i.e., cracking passwords over a broken hash function); in this case we show that
the average guesswork is very similar to classic guesswork.
In this work we consider two types of brute force attacks: A remote attack and an insider attack. These
attacks are presented in Figure 5 and defined in Definition 9 and Definition 10 respectively. In a remote
attack the adversary targets a specific user and has to find an input that is mapped to the element in B
that is paired with that user (i.e., the hash value of his password). Whereas under an insider attack an
adversary (who knows the set of user-names and hashed passwords) has to find an input whose hash value
matches any of the hash values that are stored in the system, that is, it is not targeting a specific user.
Clearly, the chance of success of an insider attack is higher than a remote attack; the reason is that given a
set of occupied bins the attacker has to find an input that is mapped to any of the bins in this set, whereas
in a remote attack he has to target a certain bin in the set that is paired with a user name. This is because
for an insider attack, it just needs one password that maps to any of the known hashed values, then as
it knows all user-name and hashed passwords, it has compromised the system. For a remote attacker, it
needs to find a password that maps to a specific bin (or hashed value) that is associated with a user-name.
We now discuss bias in hash functions. A hash function maps a large set of inputs to a set of smaller
size, where the elements in the output are termed bins. When it comes to cryptographic hash functions and
in particular password hashing functions, it is assumed for every bin that it is hard to find an input that is
mapped to a bin. One of the most basic assumptions to support this is that a hash function is not biased,
that is, the same number of inputs is mapped to any of the bins. However, in practical cryptographic hash
functions it has never been proven that this assumption holds.
In this work we represent bias based on the statistical profile of a hash function. As presented in Figure
1 a hash function can be represented by a bipartite graph. The degree distribution [25] of the bins (the
outputs) is the statistical profile of the hash function. The reason for this is that the set of degrees of the
outputs can be normalized to a probability mass function as shown in Definition 1.
When there is no bias and the set of bins is of size 2m, we get that the number of mappings per bin is the
same across all bins and so the statistical profile is a uniform PMF, that is, 2−m for any b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}.
We will use the statistical profile of a hash function to calculate the average guesswork per bin as well
as under remote and insider attacks.
B. Defining Average Guesswork for Hash Functions
In this work we derive the average guesswork for every bin as well as the average guesswork under
remote and insider attacks, under certain assumptions about the statistical profile of a hash function.
Therefore, a question that may come to mind is what is the source of randomness over which we average,
that is, what are the averaging arguments.
The first source of randomness is the probability according to which users choose their passwords; the
second source of randomness can be either a key in a keyed hash function or alternatively the strategy
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according to which an attacker guesses passwords one by one; this two sources of randomness are presented
in Definition 12.
First, we assume that users draw their passwords independently and uniformly over the set of inputs.
This assumption can be partially supported by the use of passwords managers. Furthermore, in Subsection
VII-B we analyze the case where passwords are biased.
The first averaging argument says that we average over all hash functions of a certain degree distribution,
where the degree of each bin is fixed (i.e., permutation over the connection of edges to inputs in the bipartite
graph as illustrated in Figure 2). Essentially, this is the same as considering a keyed hash function that is
biased, where all elements in the set of hash functions have the same statistical profile.
The second averaging argument (which provides an alternative to the first one) considers a hash function
with a given statistical profile and averages over all strategies of guessing passwords one by one, that
is, over all brute force attacks. We wish to point out that this averaging method is meaningful when
passwords are drawn uniformly, however it falls short when passwords are biased (as in this case an
attacker is likely to favor a certain strategy over the others). However, this averaging argument comes
handy when considering guessing using nonce in the context of proof of work. In this case the attacker
draws an input at random (nonce) at every step as an input to the hash function. This is equivalent to
drawing a strategy for guessing passwords one by one.
Under these averaging arguments we present in Definition 11 the average guesswork of a bin Gbin (b).
Basically, when there is bias, this average varies across bins as a function of the statistical profile (i.e., as
a function of b). In Theorem 1 we show that when there are 2m bins and the normalized degree (number
of inputs mapping to it normalized by the total number of inputs) of of bin b0 is 2−α·m, where α > 0, the
average guesswork of this bin Gbin (b0) = 2α·m, which is the average number of guesses to find the input
mapping to this particular bin. Note that the underlying probability mass function of Gbin (b) as well as
its average are not dependent on the passwords or the probability according to which they are drawn, but
rather on the structure (statistical profile) of the hash function.
Since the attacker does not know the hash function, and there is bias (non uniform statistical profile),
it is meaningful in our problem to define the conditional average guesswork, conditioned on the set
of occupied bins B. Essentially, the conditional average guesswork changes as a function of the set of
occupied bins due to bias. In this case users draw their passwords uniformly and these passwords are
mapped to a certain set of occupied bins B. Another measure that we analyze is the average guesswork
(i.e., the unconditional average guesswork), which is basically the average over the conditional average
guesswork and the average is taken over the set of occupied bins.
In terms of the conditional average guesswork under remote and insider attacks we answer the following
questions under the assumption that the set of occupied bins consists of A unique elements i.e., |B| = A,
and a given statistical profile:
• What is the set of occupied bins B whose conditional average guesswork is maximum; what is the
maximum conditional average guesswork (see Definition 15).
• What is the set B whose conditional average guesswork is minimum; what is the minimum conditional
average guesswork (see Definition 15).
• What is the most likely conditional average guesswork, that is, what is the most likely group of sets
of occupied bins that have the same conditional average guesswork, and what is their conditional
average guesswork (see Definition 16 and Figure 6).
Furthermore, when considering the average over the passwords that users choose or alternatively
averaging over all possible sets of occupied bins, we answer the following question:
• What is the average guesswork when averaging over all possible sets of bins B. This is presented in
Definition 17.
C. The average Guesswork under the type-class statistical profile
In order to derive closed form expressions for the average guesswork under remote and insider attacks
we model bias (statistical profile) by using the distribution of type-classes from the method of types.
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We assume a natural mapping from bins to the statistical profile, that is, when considering the binary
representation of bin b we get
PH (b) = 2
−m·(H(q)+D(q||p)), (17)
where 0 < p < 1/2 and q = (# ones in b)/m. This means that the number of edges of bin b divided by
the total number of edges in the bipartite graph is PH (b).
For type-class statistical profile, given in equation (17), we get that bins of the same type have the same
degree/probability (at least in terms of their exponent). This in turn means that under equation (17) we get
sets of bins that are biased and are equally likely. In particular, every bin in the typical set has normalized
degree that decreases like 2−m·H(p) and there are 2m·H(p) such bins. Therefore, under this assumption we
get that the hash function is biased towards a certain subset of bins, whose elements are (approximately)
uniformly distributed within the set. This is presented in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
We wish to point out that under both remote and insider attacks, the average guesswork does not change
when considering permutation of the degree distribution; the average guesswork E
(
Gremote/insider (B)
)
remains the same up to permutation over the set of occupied bins. In terms of the example given in
Figure 1 it means that considering the degree distribution {3/22, 3/22, 3/22, 1/22, 3/22, 3/22, 3/22} and
the degree distribution {1/22, 3/22, 3/22, 3/22, 3/22, 3/22, 3/22} leads to the same average guesswork
under remote and insider attacks up to a permutation over the set of occupied bins that achieves this
average guesswork. Hence, the assumption made in equation (17) is not very restrictive.
We begin by presenting the average guesswork per bin E (Gbin (b)) for a type-class statistical profile.
In this case, when bin b is of type q and the input size is large enough we get that E (Gbin (b)) increases
like 1/PH (b) = 2m·(H(q)+D(q||p)) for large m, which is nothing but the average over geometric distribution,
where the probability of success is PH (b). This is presented in Theorem 2.
Next, we focus on the conditional average guesswork under an insider attack in order to highlight our
results on the most likely conditional average guesswork as well as the maximum and minimum conditional
average guesswork. For all of this cases we assume that the number of users is 2R·m = 2m·H(s), where
1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1, and |B| = 2R·m, that is, the passwords of the users are mapped to unique bins2.
The most likely conditional average guesswork in this case increases like 2m·(H(p)−R), when 0 ≤ R ≤
H (p). Furthermore, when 0 ≤ R ≤ H (p) /2 the probability for the most likely average guesswork goes
to 1 (the probability presented in equation (15)), that is, the probability that that all elements in B are
unique and the average guesswork is 2m·(H(p)−R) goes to 1. This result is presented in Corollary 1. Note
that Corollary 1 also shows that the probability of hitting the most likely average guesswork scales super
exponentially.
In Remark 16 we show that the effect of increasing R (i.e., the number of users) is far worse than
increasing bias (when p deviates away from 1/2) in terms of the exponent of the average guesswork.
We now present the maximum conditional average guesswork under an insider attack. In this case the
conditional average guesswork increases like 2m·D(s||p). This is achieved when passwords are mapped to
the 2m·R = 2m·H(s) bins with lowest degrees, where 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1. Interestingly enough, as p decreases
basically the exponent D (s||p) increases unboundedly as it becomes less likely for an attacker to hit these
bins. We present this result in Theorem 3. Note that the chance of drawing a set of occupied bins of size
|B| = 2R·m that is mapped to the least likely bins decreases super exponentially in m.
The minimum conditional average guesswork when |B| = 2R·m is also presented in Theorem 3. In this
case as long as 0 ≤ R ≤ H (p) the conditional average guesswork under an insider attack increases like
2m·D(1−s||p), where again R = H (s). This function does not increase unboundedly as p decreases.
We wish to point out that in this subsection we do not average over all possible sets of occupied bins
(or alternatively over the passwords), but rather use the averaging arguments of Definition 12.
2We assume that users are mapped to unique bins for simplicity. The expressions can be modified for the case where they are not mapped
to unique bins; essentially, it only affects the expressions for guesswork under an insider attack as the set of occupied bins decreases.
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E(GP (B))
(a) The average guesswork when averaging over all sets
of occupied bins.
E(Gonline(B))
(b) The conditional average guesswork under a
remote attack, when every element of the set of
occupied bins is in the typical set.
Figure 7. On the right hand side: The conditional average guesswork. When 0 ≤ R < H (p) /2 the probability that the conditional
average guesswork is 2H(p)·m goes to 1. Therefore, the probability mass function of GP (B) is concentrated around 2H(p)·m. On the left
hand side: When averaging over all passwords/sets of occupied bins we get that E (GP (B)) lies in the tail of its probability mass function.
D. How is it Different from Classical Results on Guesswork?
We now consider the case where averaging over all sets of occupied bins or alternatively averaging
over the conditional average guesswork as presented in Definition 17 and Lemma 6 and denoted by
E (GP (B)). Note that this is equivalent to averaging over all passwords.
We focus on the average guesswork under a remote attack. In this case the conditional average guesswork
increases like 2H(p)·m (this is presented in Corollary 2), when every element of the set of occupied bins
is in the typical set. When R < H (p) /2 we get that the probability that every bin of the set of occupied
bins is in the typical set goes to 1.
Furthermore, the results of Theorem 5 show that the probability that the conditional average guesswork
is smaller than 2m·H(p) goes to zero. Indeed, the conditional average guesswork is concentrated around
its mean value (i.e., concentrated around 2H(p)·m), when every element in the set of occupied bins is in
the typical set and 0 ≤ R < H (p) /2. This is in contrast with classical results on average guesswork (see
[10] as well as Subsection II-A), where it is shown that the average guesswork, when guessing a secret
directly, lies in the tail of the probability function of guesswork, which means that in the classic case the
probability mass function is not concentrated around its mean value.
On the other hand, when averaging over all passwords (basically over all sets of occupied bins) and
passwords are drawn uniformly i.i.d. we get that the average guesswork E (GP (B)) increases like 2m
which is exactly the average guesswork when there is no bias. This result is presented in Corollary 3.
Therefore, we say that E (GP (B)) is a measure that is too crude to quantify the effect of bias on
the average guesswork of hash functions. In this sense the conditional average guesswork presented in
the previous subsection captures the effect of bias better than averaging over all elements including the
set of occupied bins. It also means that the when 0 ≤ R ≤ H (p) /2, the random variable GP (B) is
concentrated around 2H(p)·m, whereas its average lies in the tail of its probability mass function. This is
similar to results on the average guesswork in the classic case [15]. This is also illustrated in Figure 7.
E. Using Bias to Increase the Average Guesswork
Another question that may come to mind is whether bias can be used to increase the average guesswork
of hash functions. As we show in Theorem 6 indeed bias can increase the average guesswork as long
as there is a backdoor mechanism (such as the one presented in Definition 25) that maps password to
the least likely set of occupied bins. In this case the average guesswork under a remote attack increases
like 2(2·H(p)+D(1−p||p)−R)·m; this function increases unboundadly as p decreases. This is also illustrated in
Figure 9.
V. GENERAL EXPRESSIONS
In this section we present several general results as well as motivation for modeling PH (b) through the
method of types.
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Theorem 1. [Average number of guesses of a bin] Assume that the attacker guesses inputs of a PH (b)-
hash function one by one until it finds one that is mapped to bin b0 (remote or insider attacks), where
PH (b0) = 2
−α·m, and α > 0. In this case, under the averaging arguments of Definition 12 we get that
when n ≥ (1 + ǫ1) · α ·m, ǫ1 > 0, the average guesswork of bin b0, Gbin (b0), is equal to
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gbin (b0))) = lim
m→∞
1
m
log (1/PH (b0)) = α. (18)
Sketch of proof. The general idea is that when n is large enough, the probability of finding an input that
is mapped to bin b0 converges to the geometric distribution PH (b) · (1− PH (b))i−1, where i ≥ 1 is the
number of guesses. The challenge in showing this lies in the fact that the chance of hitting this bin in
the first guess is PH (b0) under the averaging arguments presented in the previous section, whereas as the
number of guesses increases the chance of guessing an input that is mapped to b0 increases. The reason is
that the attacker does not repeat his guesses and the ensemble of hash functions is based on permutation
of the edges that are connected to the inputs (Figure 2). When the input size is large enough and PH (b)
decreases exponentially with m, the probability of guessing converges to geometric distribution which
means that as m increases the average guesswork converges to 1/PH (b0) = 2α·m. The proof is in Section
XI.
Remark 10. Note that under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the derivation of the average guesswork
under an insider attack E (Ginsider (B)) is straightforward as long as
∑
b∈B PH (b) = 2
−α∗·m, where
α∗ > 0.
Remark 11. In order to find closed form expressions for
E (Gremote (B)) = 2
−R·m∑
b∈B
E (Gbin (b))
as well as to gain better understanding of the effect of bias on the level of security of hashed passwords,
we make in Definition 18 an additional assumption about the statistical profile, that it is a type-class
statistical profile, with PH (b) specified in (18).
Definition 18.
PH (b) = 2
−m·(H(q)+D(q||p)) (19)
where q = N (1|b) /m and N (1|b) is the number of ones in the binary representation of b ∈ (1, . . . , 2m).
Remark 12. The results in this paper under the assumption made in Definition 18 also hold for any
PH (b) that is permutation of the mappings from b to PH (b).
Remark 13 (Motivation for the analyzing under the method of types). The method of types means that
elements in certain subsets of certain volumes are almost equally likely (e.g., in the most likely subset the
probability of each element decreases at rate H (p)).
VI. THE AVERAGE GUESSWORK OF TYPE-CLASS STATISTICAL PROFILE HASH FUNCTIONS
In this section we analyze the average guesswork of type-class statistical profile, which we interchange-
ably use with the terminology PH (b)-hash functions.
We assume that each password consists of n bits that are drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2) and analyze
the average guesswork . In order to find closed form expressions to the average guesswork under both
remote and insider attacks based on the averaging arguments in Definition 12, we model bias through the
method of types as presented in Definition 18. We begin by deriving the average guesswork per bin, and
then bound the average guesswork under remote and insider attacks as well as the most likely average
guesswork under those attacks. In addition, we present a concentration result.
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The results of this subsection provide quantifiable bounds for the effect of bias as well as the effect of
the number of users, on the average guesswork of a hash function. Furthermore, these results show that
increasing the umber of users has a far worse effect on the average guesswork than bias.
the next theorem presents the average guesswork for any bin.
Theorem 2 (Average number of guesses for each bin). Assume that the attacker guesses inputs of a
PH (b)-hash function one by one until it finds one that is mapped to bin b (remote or insider attacks). In
this case, under the averaging arguments of Definition 12 we get that when n ≥ (1 + ǫ1) · log (1/p) ·m,
ǫ1 > 0, the average guesswork of Gbin (b) is equal to
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gbin (b))) = lim
m→∞
1
m
log (1/PH (b)) = H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p) (20)
where b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}, and q (b) = N(1|b)
m
is the type of b.
Sketch of proof. Similarly to Theorem 1 we show that the probability of hitting a bin converges to
geometric distribution. This in turn means that the average guesswork of bin b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} can be
achieved by assigning α = H (q (b))+D (q (b) ||p), where this is achieved under the method of types and
large deviation theory, which lead to PH (b) ≈ 2−(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p))·m. However, unlike Theorem 1 here we
want guesswork to converge to geometric distribution for every b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}. This in turn leads to the
bound n ≥ (1 + ǫ1) · log (1/p) ·m. The proof is in Section XI.
We begin by considering the average guesswork under an insider attack.
Remark 14. The average guesswork (E (Gremote (B))) is a function of the bins stored in the system, that
is, a function of B (the set of hashed passwords of the users). Therefore, unlike guesswork for the classic
case, in the case of hashed passwords it is meaningful to consider upper and lower bounds on the average
guesswork as well as the most likely average guesswork based on the probability of drawing passwords
that are mapped to the most likely set of bins. Figure 6 illustrates this.
Next, we present bounds for the average guesswork. In order to derive the bounds we assume that the
bins to which passwords are mapped are either the most likely bins or the least likely ones. This in turn
enables us to come up with a lower and an upper bounds for the average guesswork, respectively. On the
other hand, we find the most probable average guesswork by characterizing the most likely set of bins
that have the same average guesswork.
The following theorem presents the maximum and minimum average guesswork presented in Definition
15.
Theorem 3 (Bounds on the average guesswork under an insider attacks). Under the following assumptions:
• An insider attack as presented in Definition 10.
• The passwords that the users have chosen are mapped to 2H(s)·m−1 different (unique) bins, where
1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1 (i.e., |B| = 2H(s)·m−1); the passwords are drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2).
• PH (b) is defined in Definition 18 under the method of types, where p ≤ 1/2.
• n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m · log (1/p) where ǫ > 0.
In this case we get the following bounds{
D (1− s||p) 0 ≤ 1− s ≤ p
0 p ≤ 1− s ≤ 1/2 ≤ limm→∞
1
m
log (E (Ginsider (B))) ≤ D (s||p) , (21)
where we average based on Definition 12.
Sketch of proof. The general idea is bounding the average guesswork based on equation (13), (14) and
the method of types, assuming that the set of occupied bins is the set of bins of size |B| = 2H(s)·m−1 that
occupies the 2H(s)·m−1 bins with highest (lowest) degrees. The least (most) likely |B| bins are the set of
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size |B| of smallest (largest) values of PH (b). For example the set of lowest degrees satisfies ∀b ∈ B and
∀b′ ∈ Bc the inequality PH (b) ≤ PH
(
b
′)
. The full proof appears in Section XI.
We now find the most likely average guesswork as presented in Definiton 16.
Corollary 1 (The most likely average guesswork under an insider attacks). Under the following assump-
tions:
• As insider attack as presented in Definition 10.
• There are 2H(s)·m unique hashed passwords of users that are stored in the system, where 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1
(i.e., |B| = 2H(s)·m); passwords are drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2).
• PH (b) defined based on the method of types and presented in Definition18, where p ≤ 1/2.
• n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m · log (1/p) where ǫ > 0.
The average number of guesses required to find a password that is mapped to any of the bins in B, can
be characterized as follows:
• The probability that all passwords are mapped to different bins of type q such that 0 ≤ 1−s < q ≤ p,
decreases like e−2
m·(2·H(1−s)−H(q)) × 2−m·D(q||p)·2H(1−s)·m .
• In this case the average guesswork E (Ginsider (B)) increases like 2m·(H(q)+D(q||p)−H(1−s)).
• The most likely type is q = p, and the probability that all passwords are mapped to different bins of
type p goes to 1.
• Furthermore, when q = p the average guesswork E (Ginsider (B)) increases like 2m·(H(p)−H(s)); this
is the most likely average guesswork.
• Finally, when p ≤ 1 − s ≤ 1/2 the most likely type is again q = p, and the rate of the most likely
average guesswork is equal to 0.
We average based on Definition 12.
Sketch of proof. The general idea behind the proof is that the guesswork is a function of the set of occupied
bins B. Based on Theorem 2 it can be shown that for every set of occupied bins that are in the typical set
of PH (b), the average guesswork is the same. Using Lemma 1 and the method of types it can be shown
that for the typical set q = p and PH (b) = 2−m·H(p), in which case the average guesswork increases
like 2m·(H(p)−H(s)). Furthermore, when |B| ≤ 2H(p)·m and passwords are drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2) the
probability that the set of occupied bins is in the typical set of PH (b) goes to 1. The full proof appears
in Section XI.
Remark 15. Corollary 1 shows that when 0 ≤ 1−s ≤ p it is most likely that B consists of unique bins of
type p (with probability that goes to 1), in which case the average guesswork increases like 2m·(H(p)−H(s)).
Remark 16 (The effect of bias vs. the effect of the number of users). The effect of the number of users
on the average guesswork is far worse than the effect of bias, that is, as the number of users increases the
average guesswork decreases at a higher rate than the one when the number of users remains constant
and bias increases. In order to illustrate this statement let us focus on the rate at which the most likely
average guesswork increases, H (p)−H (1− s), where 0 ≤ 1− s ≤ p (although it holds for the bounds
of Theorem 3 as well). First, let us focus on the effect of increasing the number of users on the average
guesswork. The first derivative of H (p)−H (1− s) with respect to p is
log2 (p)− log2 (1− p) (22)
which is equal to zero at p = 1/2 (i.e., when there is no bias), In addition, the first derivative around
p = 1/2 is very small and therefore bias has a little effect on the average guesswork. On the other hand
the rate at which the number of users increases is H (1− s), and so the average guesswork decreases
linearly with H (1− s). This in turn shows that change in bias does not affect the average guesswork to
the same extent as change in the number of users. We illustrate this observation in Table I.
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Table I
THE RATE AT WHICH THE MOST LIKELY AVERAGE GUESSWORK INCREASES ALONG WITH THE LOWER AND UPPER BOUNDS. NOTE THAT
AT p = 1/2 THE BOUNDS MEET. FURTHERMORE, THIS EXAMPLE ILLUSTRATES THAT INCREASING THE NUMBER OF USERS HAS A FAR
WORSE EFFECT THAN BIAS AS STATED IS REMARK 16. WHEN THERE IS NO BIAS AND THE NUMBER OF USERS INCREASES LIKE
2m·H(0.2) THE AVERAGE GUESSWORK INCREASES AT THE SAME RATE AS IN THE CASE WHEN THE NUMBER OF USERS IS 2m·H(0.1) AND
THE BIAS IS p = 0.21. FURTHERMORE, WHEN THE BIAS IS p = 0.45 THE AVERAGE GUESSWORK IS VERY CLOSE TO ONE.
p, 1− s H (p)−H (1− s) D (1− s||p) D (s||p)
p=1/2, 1− s = 0 1 1 1
p = 0.45, 1− s = 0 0.9948 0.8625 1.15
p = 1/2, 1− s = 0.2 0.2781 0.2781 0.2781
p = 0.21, 1− s = 0.1 0.2725 0.0622 1.5914
We now analyze the average guesswork under a remote attack. We find bounds for the average guesswork
as presented in Definition 15 and also find the most likely average guesswork defined in Definition 16.
Theorem 4 (Bounds on the average guesswork under a remote attack). Under the following assumptions:
• The attack defined in Definition 9.
• There are 2H(s)·m−1 users whose passwords are mapped to different (unique) bins, where 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1;
passwords are drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2).
• PH (b) is based on the method of types as presented in Definition 18, where p ≤ 1/2.
• n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m · log (1/p) where ǫ > 0.
The rate of the average guesswork when averaged according to Definition 12, is bounded by
H (s) +D (1− s||p) ≤ lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gremote (B)))
≤
{
H (s) +D (s||p) (1− p) ≤ s ≤ 1
2 ·H (p) +D (1− p||p)−H (s) 1/2 ≤ s ≤ (1− p) . (23)
Proof. The full proof appears in Section XI.
Next, we find the most likely average guesswork under remote attacks.
Corollary 2 (The most likely average guesswork under a remote attack). When the following assumptions
hold.
• The attack defined in Definition 9.
• There are 2H(s)·m users whose passwords are mapped to unique bins, where 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1; passwords
are drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2).
• PH (b) is based on the method of types as Defined in Definition 18, p ≤ 1/2.
• n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m · log (1/p) where ǫ > 0.
For any user, the average number of guesses required to find a password that is mapped to its bin can
be characterized as follows.
• The probability that all passwords are mapped to different bins of type q such that 0 ≤ 1−s < q ≤ p,
decreases like e−2
m·(2·H(1−s)−H(q)) × 2−m·D(q||p)·2H(1−s)·m .
• In this case the average guesswork of any of the users E (Gbin (b)) as well as E (Gremote (B)) increase
like 2m·(H(q)+D(q||p)).
• Furthermore, the most likely type is q = p (with probability that goes to 1) in which case the average
guesswork is 2m·H(p).
the average is done in accordance with Definition 12.
Proof. The full proof appears in Section XI.
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The next corollary presents the average guesswork when averages over all passwords/set of occupied
bins as presented in equation 16.
Corollary 3 (The Average Guesswork under a remote attack when averaged over all passwords). When
each user chooses its password uniformly and passwords are statistically independent, the average guess-
work under a remote attack when averaging over the passwords increases at rate that is equal to
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (GP (B))) = 1
where n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m · log (1/p).
Sketch of proof. Basically, averaging over all passwords is equivalent to averaging over all possible sets of
occupied bins. When the passwords of the users are drawn i.i.d. from a uniform distribution the probability
that a password is mapped to bin b and its average guesswork is in turn 1/PH (b) is PH (b); multiplying
this two terms gives 1 for any b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}. The average is achieved by summing over all bins and
so the average guesswork is 2m as there are 2m bins. This holds for every user and so when averaging
over all users we also get that the average guesswork under a remote attack is 2m. The lower bound on
the input size is required so that as m increases the average guesswork converges to 1/PH (b) for every
b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}.
The full proof appears in Section XI.
Finally, we provide a concentration result for each bin that is stored on the sever as well as under
insider attacks.
Theorem 5 (Concentration result under both remote and insider attacks). Under the same assumptions as
in Corollary 2 we get the following concentration result when averaging in accordance with Definition
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− lim
m→∞
1
m
log
(
P
(
Gbin (b) ≤ 2(1−ǫ1)·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p))·m
)) ≥ ǫ1 · log (1/p) , (24)
where 0 < ǫ1 < 1 and bin b is of type q (b).
This concentration result applies to the average guesswork of Theorem 3 as well.
Proof. The proof is in Section XI.
A few remarks are in order.
Remark 17. From Theorem 5 we can state that for any PH (b)-hash function and any bin, the frac-
tion of strategies of guessing passwords one by one, for which the number of guesses is smaller than
2(1−ǫ1)·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p))·m, decreases like 2−ǫ1·log(1/p)·m; in addition, for the PH (b)-set of hash functions,
any bin and any strategy of guessing passwords one by one, the fraction of PH (b)-hash functions for
which the number of guesses is smaller than 2(1−ǫ1)·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p))·m, also decreases like 2−ǫ1·log(1/p)·m.
Remark 18. The fact that the average guesswork of every bin scales with its probability, as presented
in Corollary 4, leads to average guesswork over all passwords that scales like 2m which is larger than
2m·H1/2(p).
Remark 19. The concentration result of Theorem 5 shows that the probability mass function of the
average guesswork when cracking password is concentrated around its mean value. This is in contrast
with the average guesswork for guessing a password [10] in which case the probability mass function
is concentrated around the typical set in the i.i.d. case, whereas the average guesswork can be derived
based on a large deviations argument [14]. On the other hand, when averaging over all passwords as in
Corollary 3 we get that the average guesswork E (GP (B)) lies in the tail of the probability mass function
just like in the classic case of [10].
21
Remark 20. In this subsection we assume that passwords are drawn uniformly. When passwords are
biased there is a certain optimal strategy [10] and therefore, there is no use of averaging over all
possible strategies. In this case averaging is done over the PH (b)-set of hash functions as presented
in Definition 12. In this case, similarly to Corollary 6 the average guesswork is equal to the dominant
term between the average number of guesses required to guess the password, and the average number of
guesses required to guess a password that is mapped to the same bin.
VII. THE AVERAGE GUESSWORK OF A MODIFIED PH (b)-HASH FUNCTION
In this section we again analyze the average guesswork of the PH (b)-hash function of Section VI with
the exception that a centralized procedure maps the passwords of the users to the least likely bins. We
show that in this case the average guesswork can increase unboundedly as a function of bias.
We begin by defining a centralized procedure that maps the password of the users to the least likely
bins. We then find the average guesswork under both a remote and an insider attacks, when passwords are
drawn uniformly. Finally, we quantify how bias in drawing the passwords of the users affects the average
guesswork.
Definition 19 (bin allocation). Assume that the number of users M = 2m·H(s)−1 ≤ 2m, the bin allocation
method is defined as follows. For each user a procedure allocates a different bin b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} according
to the following method: The first user receives the least likely bin (i.e., when considering any hash
function, this is the bin that has the smallest fraction of mappings; when considering a universal set of
hash functions, this is the all ones bin), the second user receives the second least likely bin, whereas the
last user receives the M th least likely bin.
Three remarks regarding bins allocation are in order.
Remark 21. In Definition 25 we present a “backdoor” mechanism that efficiently implements the bins
allocation procedure presented in Definition 19, without decreasing the average guesswork.
Remark 22. In Definition 19 we state that when two users have different passwords, they are mapped to
different bins. In general, this is required in order for the backdoor mechanism discussed in remark 21
not to decrease the average guesswork.
Remark 23. mapping passwords to the least likely bins, either based on the fractions of mappings or on
the distribution of the key when considering a keyed hash function, is essential for using bias to increase
the average guesswork.
Next, we find the average guesswork for every bin b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}.
Corollary 4. Assume that the attacker guesses inputs of a PH (b)-hash function one by one until it finds
one that is mapped to bin b (remote or insider attacks). In this case, under the averaging arguments of
Definition 12 and when bins are allocated to users according to Definition 19 we get for n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·
m · (log (1/p) +H (s)) where ǫ > 0; the average guesswork of bin b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gbin (b))) = lim
m→∞
1
m
log (1/PH (b)) = H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p) (25)
where q (b) is the type of bin b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} and averaging is done according to Definition 12.
Proof. The proof is similar to the poof of Theorem 2 with the exception that here bin allocation is in
place. In order to make sure that bin allocation does not affect the average guesswork the minimum input
length increases from n ≥ (1 + ǫ1) · log (1/p) ·m bits to n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m · (log (1/p) +H (s)). The proof
appears in Section X.
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Figure 8. The rate at which the average guesswork increases (i.e., limm→∞ 1m log (E (Gremote (B)))) as a function of s ∈ [1/2, 1]; the
number of users is 2H(s)·m−1 and so the larger s is, the smaller the number of users is. Hence, s = 1/2 represents the largest number of users,
whereas s = 1 represents the smallest number. For 1/2 ≤ s ≤ (1− p) the average guesswork is equal to 2 ·H (p) +D (1− p||p)−H (s),
and for (1− p) ≤ s ≤ 1 the average guesswork equals H (s) +D (s||p). Note that for p = 1/2 the average guesswork increases at rate
that equals 1 regardless of the number of users, whereas as p decreases the rate of the average guesswork increases.
A. The Case where Passwords are Drawn Uniformly
We begin by finding the average guesswork across users under a remote attack when the passwords
are drawn uniformly, followed by a concentration result. We then consider an insider attack in which the
attacker tries to find a password that is mapped to any of the assigned bins.
Theorem 6 (The average guesswork under a remote attack). Under the following assumptions.
• The attack defined in Definition 9.
• Bins are allocated as in Definition 25 to M = 2H(s)·m−1 users, where 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1.
• Passwords are drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2).
• PH (b) is based on the method of types as presented in Definition 18, where p ≤ 1/2.
• n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m · (log (1/p) +H (s)) where ǫ > 0.
The average guesswork when averaging according to Definition 12 is equal to
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gremote (B))) =
{
H (s) +D (s||p) (1− p) ≤ s ≤ 1
2 ·H (p) +D (1− p||p)−H (s) 1/2 ≤ s ≤ (1− p) . (26)
Proof. The full proof appears in Section X.
Remark 24. Note that the rate at which the average guesswork increases{
H (s) +D (s||p) (1− p) ≤ s ≤ 1
2 ·H (p) +D (1− p||p)−H (s) 1/2 ≤ s ≤ (1− p) (27)
is an unbounded function that increases as p decreases. However, as p decreases, the minimal size of the
input n = (log (1/p) +H (s)) ·m increases too. Hence, the smaller p is, the more asymptotic this result
becomes, in terms of the size of the input required to achieve this average.
Figure 8 illustrates the above result.
Theorem 7 (A concentration result). Under the following assumptions.
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• The attacks defined Definition 9 and Definition 10.
• Bins are allocated as in Definition 25 to M = 2H(s)·m−1 users, where 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1.
• Passwords are drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2).
• PH (b) is based on the method of types as presented in Definition 18, where p ≤ 1/2.
• n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m · (log (1/p) +H (s)) where ǫ > 0.
The following concentration result holds for all users when avraging according to Definition 12:
− lim
m→∞
1
m
log
(
P
(
Gbin (b) ≤ 2(1−ǫ1)·(H(s)+D(s||p))·m
)) ≥ ǫ1 · log (1/p) ∀b ∈ B (28)
where 0 < ǫ1 < 1.
Proof. The proof is in Section X.
Figure 9 illustrates the intuition behind the above results.
Bins
Inputs
b¯
Figure 9. Due to unbalance, there is only one mapping from the set of inputs to the solid black bin b¯ (the solid black line). Hence, the
average number of guesses required to find a password that is mapped to it, is larger than the average number of guesses of the other bins,
that is, the average guesswork of b¯ is larger than the average guesswork of the others.
Corollary 5 (The average guesswork under an insider attack). When the following assumptions hold.
• The attack defined in Definition 10.
• Bins are allocated as in Definition 25 to M = 2H(s)·m−1 users, where 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1.
• Passwords are drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2).
• PH (b) is based on the method of types as presented in Definition 18, where p ≤ 1/2.
• n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m · (log (1/p) +H (s)) where ǫ > 0.
the average is equal to
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Ginsider (B))) = D (s||p) . (29)
Proof. The full proof appears in Section X.
Remark 25. We assume that the number of users M = 2H(s)·m−1 since based on Definition 19, it assures
that the type of each bin b ∈ B satisfies s ≤ q (b) ≤ 1, where q (b) is the type of bin b. See Remark 34
for more details.
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B. The Case where Passwords are Biased
The next corollary presents the effect of a biased password on the average guesswork. We consider
the case where passwords are drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(θ). Based on the concentration result of Theorem
7, we characterize a region in which the guesswork of Theorem 6 dominates the average guesswork as
well as another region in which the average guesswork of a password (3) is the dominant one. Since in
this case the optimal strategy is guessing passwords based on their probabilities in descending order [10],
the optimal average guesswork should be averaged over a keyed PH (b)-hash function (i.e., not over all
possible strategies of guessing passwords).
Corollary 6 (Biased passwords). Under the following assumptions.
• The attack defined in Definition 9.
• Bins are allocated as in Definition 25 to M = 2H(s)·m−1 users, where 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1.
• Unlike Definition 25, here the passwords are drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(θ), where 0 < θ < 1/2.
• PH (b) is based on the method of types as presented in Definition 18, where p ≤ 1/2.
• n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m · (log (1/p) +H (s)) where ǫ > 0.
When passwords are guessed based on their probabilities in descending order, the average guesswork of
a user who is mapped to bin b ∈ B, averaged over a keyed PH (b)-hash function as in Definition 12 is
equal to
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gbin (b))) =
limm→∞
{
n
m
H1/2 (θ) 2 · nm ·H
( √
θ√
θ+
√
1−θ
)
< H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p)
H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p) n
m
H (θ) > H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p)
.(30)
Furthermore, the average guesswork across users is
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gremote (B))) = lim
m→∞
n
m
H1/2 (θ)
2n
m
H
( √
θ√
θ +
√
1− θ
)
< H (s) +D (s||p) (31)
and
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gremote (B))) =
{
H (s) +D (s||p) (1− p) ≤ s ≤ 1
2 ·H (p) +D (1− p||p)−H (s) 1/2 ≤ s ≤ (1− p) (32)
when limm→∞ nmH (θ) > log (1/p).
Proof. The full proof appears in Section X.
We now give an illustrative example for the result above.
Example 2. Consider the case where n = (1 + ǫ) · log (1/p) ·m and every user out of the 2H(s)·m−1 users
draws his password i.i.d. Bernoulli(θ). In this case, when 2 (1 + ǫ) · log (1/p) ·H
( √
θ√
θ+
√
1−θ
)
< H (s) +
D (s||p) the rate at which the average guesswork across users increases equals (1 + ǫ)·log (1/p)·H1/2 (θ),
whereas when (1 + ǫ) · log (1/p) ·H (θ) > log (1/p) the rate is equal to{
H (s) +D (s||p) (1− p) ≤ s ≤ 1
2 ·H (p) +D (1− p||p)−H (s) 1/2 ≤ s ≤ (1− p)
.
VIII. THE AVERAGE GUESSWORK OF A STRONGLY UNIVERSAL SET OF HASH FUNCTIONS
In this section we derive the average guesswork for strongly universal set of hash functions when the
key is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p), 0 < p ≤ 1/2. In Subsection VIII-A we derive the average guesswork for
any bin as a function of the bias p. Then, in Subsection VIII-B we calculate the average guesswork as a
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function of the number of users and the bias. Furthermore, we present the backdoor mechanism to allocate
bins. Finally, in Subsection VIII-C we analyze the guesswork when the hash function is not modified.
We begin by defining strongly universal set of hash functions [8], which is nothing but the set of all
hash functions with an input of length n bits and an output of length m bits.
Definition 20. A strongly universal set of hash functions is the set
{
Hf(k) (·)
}
, where k is a key of size
m · 2n, f (k) is a bijection, and {Hi (·)}, i ∈ {1, . . . , m · 2n}, is the set of all hash function with input of
length n bits and output of length m bits.
We now define the mapping of keys to hash functions that we consider in this work for biased keys.
Definition 21. When the key is broken into 2n segments of size m such that
k = {k1, . . . , k2n} . (33)
we state that the mapping g (·) leads to the following mapping from keys to hash functions
Hg(k) (i) = ki i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n} . (34)
In this work, when considering biased keys we assume the mapping g (·). Figure 10 illustrates the
definition presented above.
Keyed Hash Function
k =
k1
ki
k2n
Key
i ki
Figure 10. The definition of the keyed hash function that we analyze in this paper. When the input equals i, the output is equal to the ith
segment of the key, that is, ki. Essentially, this is a strongly universal set of hash functions.
Remark 26. Note that the set of hash functions presented in Definition 4 is a subset of a strongly universal
set of hash functions.
Remark 27. Note that the mapping defined in equations (33), (34) from the set of keys to the set of all
possible hash functions, is a strongly universal set of hash functions. Any other mapping that is a bijection
from the set of keys to the set of all possible hash function also constitutes a strongly universal set of hash
functions. Essentially, in section IX we show that this mapping along with a biased key achieves better
performance than an unbiased key with any mapping that is a bijection (see Corollary 9 for the average
guesswork of an unbiased key and any mapping that is a bijection). A biased key with other mappings
may also lead to better performance than the one achieved with an unbiased key; however, we have been
able to quantify the average guesswork for the mapping defined in equations (33), (34).
In terms of the knowledge the attacker has under a remote and an insider attacks defined in Definition
9 and Definition 10 respectively, when the system uses the universal set of hash functions defined in
equations (33), (34), we make two additional assumptions: The key is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p); and the
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attacker knows the distribution according to which the key is drawn, but it does not know the actual
realization of the key.
A. The Guesswork of Each Bin
In this subsection we derive the guesswork for each bin, when the key is i.i.d. Bernoulli(p). Assume a
strongly universal set of hash functions as defined equations (33), (34). Note that although in Definition 22
we describe procedure according to which bins are allocated, this procedure is different from the backdoor
mechanism which is given in Definition 23.
Definition 22 (Bins allocation). Assume there are ⌊2H(s)·m−1⌋ users, where s ∈ [1/2, 1]. For each user a
procedure allocates a different integer b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} according to the following method: The first user
receives the least likely bin (i.e., the all ones bin), the second user receives the second least likely bin,
whereas the last user receives the ⌊2H(s)·m−1⌋th least likely bin. Then, assuming Lb passwords are mapped
to bin b, the procedure uniformly draws a password from {1, . . . , |Lb|}. In the case when |Lb| = 0, the
bin is not mapped to any password and we assume that the average guesswork is equal to zero.
A remark is in order regarding the case where a user has no password.
Remark 28. Note that the backdoor mechanism presented in Definition 23 does not allow a scenario
where a user has no password. As shown in Theorem 11, this does not affect the average guesswork.
The next lemma proves that the order according to which the attacker guesses passwords, does not
affect the average guesswork.
Lemma 7. For any bin b, the average guesswork is not affected by the order according to which the
attacker guesses passwords one by one, when averaging over all possible keys.
Proof. Consider a certain bin b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}. The attacker knows the probability mass function according
to which the key is drawn. It also knows the set of bins allocated to the ⌊2H(s)·m−1⌋ users, as presented in
Definition 19. However, it does not know the actual realizations, and therefore the mapping from passwords
to bins. Hence, from symmetry arguments, any strategy according to which the attacker guesses passwords
one by one results in the same average guesswork, when averaging over all possible keys.
Based on Lemma 7 we assume without loss of generality that the attacker guesses passwords one by
one in ascending order. Now, we can derive the average guesswork for any bin b.
Theorem 8 (Average number of guesses for each bin). Assume that the attacker tries to guess a password
that is mapped to bin b. In this case when n ≥ (1 + ǫ1) · log (1/p) ·m, ǫ1 > 0, the average guesswork of
Gbin (b) is equal to
E (Gbin (b)) = 2
m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)) − (1− 2−m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)))2n · (2m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)) + 2n) (35)
where q (b) = N(1|b)
m
is the type of b, the key is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p), and the universal set of hash
functions is defined in equations (33), (34).
Proof. Based on Lemma 7 and without loss of generality we assume that the attacker guesses passwords
one by one in ascending order. Essentially, in order to crack bin b the attacker has to find a password
that is mapped to this bin. The proof relies on the observation that the chance of success in the lth guess
(i.e., the first time a password which is mapped to bin b is guessed) is drawn according to the following
geometric distribution
PK (b) · (1− PK (b))l−1 1 ≤ l ≤ 2n (36)
where PK (·) is the probability mass function of a vector of length m that is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p).
The probability that bin b is not mapped to any password is
(1− PK (b))2
n+1
. (37)
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Since PK (b) ≥ pm, we can state that as long as n ≥ (1 + ǫ1) · log (1/p) ·m where ǫ1 > 0, the probability
for this event vanishes exponentially fast and therefore does not affect the average guesswork; furthermore,
we assume that when this event occurs, it takes zero guesses for the attacker to crack the bin, such that
this event does not even add up to the average guesswork. We wish to stress that the “backdoor” procedure
presented in Definition 23 does not allow for a situation where a user does not have a password.
The mean value of (36) is equal to
1/PK (b)− (1− PK (b))2
n · (1/PK (b) + 2n) . (38)
Assuming bin b is of type q (b) = N(1|b)
m
, and that the key is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p), we get from Lemma
1 that
1/PK (b) = 2
m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)). (39)
By assigning the equation above in (38) we get (35).
Now, we show that the average guesswork converges uniformly to 2m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)), ∀b.
Corollary 7. The average guesswork uniformly converges to 1/PK (b) across bins. The difference is upper
bounded by the following term.
|2m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)) −E (Gbin (b)) | ≤
(
2m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)) + 2n
) · e−2n−m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p))
≤ (2m log(1/p) + 2n) · e−2n−m log(1/p) ∀b (40)
Proof. we wish to upper bound the term
(
1− 2−m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)))2n · (2m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)) + 2n) for
any b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} in order to show that it converges uniformly when n ≥ (1 + ǫ1) · log (1/p), ǫ1 > 0.
We begin by using the inequality (
1− 1
x
)x
≤ e−1 ∀x > 1 (41)
in order to get (
1− 2−m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)))2n ≤ e−2n−m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)). (42)
Furthermore, since the least likely type q (b0) = 1 occurs with probability pm = 2−m log(1/p), we get
H (q) +D (q||p) ≤ log (1/p) 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 (43)
with equality at q=1. Therefore, we get that 2−m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)) ≥ 2−m log(1/p) and 2m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)) ≤
2m log(1/p). By assigning these terms along with the inequality in equation (42) we get the desired result.
The next theorem shows that the guesswork concentrates around its mean value.
Theorem 9 (Concentration). The probability of finding a password that is mapped to bin b in less than
2m·l guesses, where l ≤ n, is upper bounded by
P
(
Gbin (b) ≤ 2m·l
) ≤ 1− e−2·2−(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)−l)·m. (44)
Therefore, whenever l < H (q (b)) + D (q (b) ||p) the probability of success in less than 2m·l attempts
decays to zero.
Proof. Based on the fact that the guesswork has a geometric distribution, we get that the chance of success
within 2m·l guesses is equal to
P
(
Gbin (b) ≤ 2m·l
)
= PK (b) ·
2m·l∑
i=1
(1− PK (b))i−1 = 1− (1− PK (b))2
m·l
. (45)
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The upper bound for P
(
Gbin (b) ≤ 2m·l
)
is obtained by assigning PK (b) = 2−m(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)) to the
following inequality
e−x ≤ 1− x
2
x ∈ [0, 1.58] . (46)
Therefore, when l < H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p) the probability of finding a password that is mapped to bin
b goes to zero.
Remark 29. Note that although the number of passwords scales exponentially with n (i.e., there are 2n
passwords), the average number of guesses scales with the size of the bins m. This is due to the fact that
cracking a password requires finding a password which is mapped to the same bin as the true password.
B. The Average Guesswork for Cracking a Password of a User under Bins Allocation
We later use the solution to the following optimization problem, in order to derive the optimal average
guesswork for cracking a password of a user.
Lemma 8.
max
0≤q≤1
2 ·H (q) +D (q||p) = 2 ·H (p) +D (1− p||p) (47)
where the optimal solution occurs at q = 1 − p. Furthermore, 2 ·H (p) +D (1− p||p) is a positive and
unbounded function that monotonically increases as p decreases.
Proof. First let us break down the expression in (47).
2 ·H (q) +D (q||p) = H (q) + q · log (1/p) + (1− q) · log (1/ (1− p)) . (48)
The above expression is a concave function as a function of q as it is the summation of two concave
functions; hence, this function has a maximal value. By calculating the first derivative and making it equal
to zero we get
log
(
1− q
q
)
= log
(
p
1− q
)
. (49)
Equality holds only when q = 1 − p. By assigning it to the expression on the left hand side in (47) we
get the desired result.
We now quantify the number of mappings from passwords to each bin.
Lemma 9. Following the definition in equations (33), (34), assume that ki is the mapping from the ith
password to the range of the hash function, where ki ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} and i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}. In this case
P
(
|2−n ·
2n∑
i=1
1b (ki)− PK (b) | > ǫ
)
≤ 1
2n · ǫ2 (50)
where 1b (x) =
{
1 x = b
0 x 6= b .
Proof. Essentially 1b (ki) is a random variable whose mean value is equal to PK (b) and variance value
is smaller than 1. Furthermore, 1b (ki), i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n} are all i.i.d. random variables. Therefore, we get
(50) from Chebyshev’s inequality.
Now we can derive the maximal average guesswork.
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Theorem 10 (The average number of guesses). Let us denote the number of users by ⌊2H(s)·m−1⌋, where
s ∈ [1/2, 1] is a parameter. The exponential rate at which the optimal average guesswork increases as a
function of m is equal to
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gremote (B))) =
{
H (s) +D (s||p) (1− p) ≤ s ≤ 1
2 ·H (p) +D (1− p||p)−H (s) 1/2 ≤ s ≤ (1− p) (51)
where n ≥ (1 + ǫ1) ·m · log (1/p), ǫ1 > 0.
Proof. The general idea behind the proof is to write the average in terms of summation over types, and
then use the fact that a vector of length m has up to m types in order to bound the average by the most
dominant term among the m types.
First let us define the set of all possible bins {b1, . . . , b2m} such that PK (bi) ≥ PK (bj) if and only
if j < i; therefore, according to Definition 19 b1 is assigned to the first user, whereas b2H(s)·m goes to
the 2H(s)·m−1th user. The average guesswork when the attacker chooses a user name to attack, uniformly
from
{
1, . . . , 2H(s)·m−1
}
, is equal to
E (Gremote (B)) = 2
−H(s)·m+1
2H(s)·m−1∑
i=1
1
pK (bi)
− ǫ (m,n, q (bi)) (52)
where ǫ (m,n, q (bi)) =
(
2m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)) + 2n
) · e−2n−m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)) in accordance with Corollary
7. Note that the term above takes into consideration the event when a mapping to b does not occur within
the 2n inputs; this probability is multiplied by zero guesses, which leads to the expression in equation
(52).
Based on the method of types [23] every bin in
{
b1, . . . , 2
H(s)·m−1}, which is the set of bins that are
allocated to the 2H(s)·m−1 users, is of type s ≤ q (bi) ≤ 1, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2H(s)·m−1, and q (bi) ≥ q (bj) if
and only if i < j. Therefore, from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 we can rewrite the summation such that is
goes across types, such that we can bound the average guesswork by the following terms
1
(m+ 1)2
2−H(s)·m+1 max
s≤q≤1
(
2m·(2·H(q)+D(q||p)) − ǫ (m,n, q) , 0) ≤ E (Gremote (B)) ≤ 2−H(s)·m+1 ∑
s≤q≤1
2m·(2·H(q)+D(q||p)).
(53)
The number of types is equal to the size of each bin, and therefore there are only m types; furthermore,
the elements in the summations above all are non-negative. Hence, when n ≥ (1 + ǫ1) ·m · log (1/p) and
m≫ 1 the following terms bound the average guesswork.
2−H(s)·m+1
(m+ 1)2
·2m·maxs≤q≤1(2·H(q)+D(q||p)) ≤ E (Gremote (B)) ≤ m·2−H(s)·m+1 ·2m·maxs≤q≤1(2·H(q)+D(q||p)). (54)
We are interested in the rate at which the guesswork grows, which based on the above bound is equal to
lim
n→∞
1
m
log (E (Gremote (B))) = −H (s) + max
s≤q≤1
(2 ·H (q) +D (q||p)) . (55)
The function 2 · H (q) + D (q||p) is concave as a function of q, with a maximal value at q = 1 − p as
shown in Lemma 8. Therefore, when (1− p) ≤ s ≤ 1 the maximal value is obtained at q = s; whereas
when 1/2 ≤ s ≤ (1− p) the maximal value 2 · H (1− p) +D (q||p) = 2 · H (p) +D (q||p) is achieved
for q = 1 − p. Note that n ≥ log (1/p) ≥ H (q) +D (q||p) for 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 which leads to the elimination
of ǫ (n,m, q). These arguments conclude the proof.
We now present a backdoor mechanism that enables to modify a hash function efficiently without
decreasing the average guesswork.
Remark 30 (A Back door Mechanism for Allocating bins). Essentially, in order for a procedure to
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allocate bins to the users, it first allocates a bin to a user, and then maps the password of this user to this
bin; furthermore, there is a certain chance that because of the key realization, there is no mapping to a
specific bin. This operation is as exhaustive as cracking the bin itself. In order for the system to allocate
bins efficiently it has to use a backdoor that enables it to allocate bins without the need to crack the hash
function as well as without compromising the security of the system (i.e., maintaining the same average
guesswork). In Definition 23 and Theorem 11 we present a back door mechanism that satisfies both of
these requirements.
Now we define a back door mechanism that enables to plant mappings in an efficient way without
compromising the security level of the hash function.
Definition 23. Given a key K = {k1, . . . , k2n} where ki ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} and 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n, and a strongly
universal set of hash functions as defined in equations (33), (34), the back door mechanism for allocating
bins is defined as follows.
• For each user choose a different bin according to the procedure described in Definition 19 (i.e., the
first user gets the least likely bin b1, the second user receives the second least likely bin b2, and the
2H(s)·m−1th user receives b2H(s)·m−1).
• Each of the users from the first to the 2H(s)·m−1th draws a password uniformly by drawing n bits
i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2).
• For each user, if the number that was drawn g ∈ {1, . . . , 2n} has not been drawn by any of the users
that have bins that are less likely than the current bin, then replace kg with the bin number allocated
to the user.
• In the case when another user who is coupled with a less likely bin, has drawn g: Do not change
the value of the key again (i.e., kg is changed only once by the user who is coupled with the least
likely bin among the bins of the users whose password is g). Instead, change the bin allocated to
the user to the least likely bin among the bins allocated to users whose password is g. Therefore, kg
is changed only once, to the least likely bin that is mapped to g.
Figure 11 illustrates the back door mechanism.
Original Key
k1
ki
k2n
User’s Password: i
User’s bin: b¯
New Key
k1
b¯
k2n
Figure 11. The backdoor mechanism. When the password of the user is equal to i, and no other user who is coupled with a bin that is less
likely than the bin of the user, has come up with this password, the ith segment of the key is replaced with the bin that is coupled with
the user. In the case when another user who is coupled with a less likely bin, has already come up with the exact same password, the more
likely bin of the user (and not the key) changes to the bin of the other user.
Theorem 11. The optimal average guesswork when allocating bins using the back door mechanism given
in Definition 23 is the same as the guesswork from Theorem 10 and is equal to
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gremote (B))) =
{
H (s) +D (s||p) (1− p) ≤ s ≤ 1
2 ·H (p) +D (1− p||p)−H (s) 1/2 ≤ s ≤ (1− p) (56)
when (1 + ǫ1) ·m · log (1/p), ǫ1 > 0.
Proof. The general idea behind the proof is that the back door procedure described in Definition 23 cannot
add more than one mapping to each bin. Therefore, given any strategy of guessing passwords one by one,
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we show that the chance of drawing a password (in the backdoor procedure) that decreases the number
of guesses bellow the average guesswork vanishes exponentially fast.
First, a few words are in order regarding the effect of the backdoor procedure presented in Definition
23. The procedure cannot add more than one mapping to each bin. This is due to the fact that when a
password that is mapped to a specific bin is drawn, then the mapping is changed to the bin of the user for
which the password was drawn. Furthermore, if the same password is drawn more than once by several
users, then the mapping does not change again; at worst more than one user is mapped to the same bin
(the probability that two users have the same password is the same as the probability of a collision, and
is equal to 2−n). When a collision occurs, the mapping to the least likely bin among the bins that are
coupled with these users, is the one assigned to all these users. Therefore, collision does not decrease the
average guesswork.
Following what we have discussed above, for any strategy we are interested in the probability of drawing
a password which is guessed within a smaller number of attempts than the average guesswork (i.e., given
any strategy of guessing passwords one by one, what is the probability that the backdoor mechanism
decreases the number of guesses bellow the average guesswork). When this event occurs we assume that
the number of guesses required to break the strongly universal set of hash functions is zero. When there
are 2H(s)·m−1 users, the set of type q (b) = max (s, 1− p) bounds the average guesswork as shown in
equation (54). Therefore, it is sufficient to focus on the bins of this type; as even when the guesswork of
bins of other type is equal to zero, the average guesswork remains the same.
Without loss of generality let us focus on the case when passwords are guessed one by one in ascending
order; the following argument holds for any other strategy of guessing passwords. For every user, the
backdoor mechanism draws a password uniformly. When n ≥ (1 + ǫ1) · m · log (1/p) as defined in
Theorem 10, the probability of drawing a password that is guesses within a smaller number of attempts
than (1 + ǫ2) ·m · log (1/p) where 0 < ǫ2 < ǫ1 is
2(1+ǫ2)·m·log(1/p)
2n
≤ 2−(ǫ1−ǫ2)·log(1/p)·m. (57)
Thus, for each bin of type q (b) = max (s, 1− p), the average guesswork is multiplied by a factor(
1− 2−(ǫ1−ǫ2)·log(1/p)·m) that approaches 1 exponentially fast as m increases. Therefore, the average
guesswork is not affected by the back door mechanism. The only difference compared to Theorem 10 is
that now the decay of ǫ (n,m, 1− p) in is dictated by ǫ2 instead of ǫ1.
Remark 31. Note that the procedure for allocating bins which is described in Definition 23, does not
require knowledge of the key in order to achieve the average guesswork of Theorem 11. The back door
mechanism requires only knowledge of which bins are the least likely to occur based on the probability
mass function according to which the key is drawn.
C. The Average Guesswork when Bins are not Allocated to Users
In this subsection we show that when the users choose their own passwords, without changing the hash
function accordingly, the average guesswork of the strongly universal set of hash functions (averaged over
all passwords) is equal to 2m for any p.
Definition 24 (No bins allocation). When bins are not allocated to users each user chooses his own
password, without modifying the hash function. The server stores the bin to which a password is mapped.
Corollary 8 (The Average Guesswork of the strongly universal set of hash functions with no bins
Allocation). When each user chooses the password uniformly over {1, . . . , 2n}, the average guesswork
when averaging over the passwords, increases at rate that is equal to
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (GD (B))) = 1
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where GD (B) is the guesswork of any user, n ≥ (1 + ǫ1) ·m · log (1/p), and the hash function is defined
in subsection II-B equations (33), (34).
Proof. From Theorem 8 and equation (38) we can state that the average guesswork for each bin is equal
to
E (GD (b)) = 1/PK (b)− (1− PK (b))2
n · (1/PK (b) + 2n) b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} . (58)
From Corollary 7 we know that the right hand side of the equation above goes to zero when n ≥
(1 + ǫ1) ·m · log (1/p).
When a user chooses a password uniformly over {1, . . . , 2n}, and the key is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p),
the probability of average guesswork that is equal to E (G (b)) (i.e., the probability of drawing a password
that is mapped to b) is equal to PK (b). Hence, we get that the average guesswork is equal to
E (GD (B)) =
2m∑
b=1
PK (b)E (GD (b)) (59)
which leads to
lim
m→∞
log (E (GD (B))) = 1. (60)
Remark 32. Note that when the least likely bins are allocated to the users (e.g., bins are allocated as in
Definition 23), the fact that there is a very small number of mappings to these bins, enables to achieve
a better average guesswork with a shorter biased key (as we show in the next section). However, when
the bins are not allocated (i.e., the hash function is not modified), the chance of drawing a password
that is mapped to a certain bin is equal to the probability of mapping a password to the very same bin.
Therefore, in this case there is a small probability of drawing a bin that has a very small number of
passwords mapped to it. This leads to an average guesswork that grows like 2m.
IX. UNIFORM KEYS VERSUS BIASED KEYS: SIZE AND STORAGE REQUIREMENTS
In this section we show that when the average guesswork is larger than the number of users, the
minimal size of a biased key that achieves the average guesswork above with a universal set of hash
functions defined in equations (33), (34), is smaller than the size of a uniform key (i.e., a key which is
i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2)) that achieves the same guesswork for the same number of users, with any mapping
from the set of keys to the set of hash functions. Furthermore, we show that the storage space required
to store the bins of all users is also significantly smaller. We wish to point out that this holds when the
passwords of the users are mapped to the least likely bins, that is, bins allocation as defined in Definition
23 is in place.
First, we show that the average guesswork of biased keys is larger than the average guesswork of any
strongly universal set of hash functions whose key is drawn i.i.d. according to Bernoulli(1/2), that is, any
mappings from the set of keys to the set of hash functions would lead to the same guesswork when the
key is uniform.
Corollary 9. When n ≥ m, the guesswork of any strongly universal set of hash functions whose key is
i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2) satisfies
lim
m→∞
1
m
log
(
G
(u)
remote (B, f (·))
)
= 1 ≤ lim
m→∞
1
m
log (Gremote (B)) 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 (61)
with equality only when p = 1/2; where f (·) is a bijection from the set of keys to the set of all possible
hash functions. Therefore, whenever 0 < p < 1/2, the average guesswork of the strongly universal set of
hash functions defined in equations (33), (34), is larger than the one achieved by any mapping f (·) over
a balanced key.
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Proof. When the key is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2) the problem of finding the average guesswork can
be regarded as a counting problem. Since f (·) is a bijection, the number of functions for which the ith
password is mapped to the jth bin is the same for any i and j. Furthermore, when l mappings are revealed,
the set of keys decreases by a factor of 2l·m and the remaining mappings are still balanced. Therefore,
for any bin the chance of cracking a password in the lth guess is a geometric distribution that equals to
2−m · (1− 2−m)l−1, l ≥ 0; this holds whenever f (·) is a bijection. Hence, the rate at which the average
guesswork increases when n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m and ǫ > 0, is equal to
lim
m→∞
log
(
G
(u)
remote (B, f (·))
)
= 1 s ∈ [1/2, 1] (62)
whereas from Theorem 10 we get that
lim
m→∞
log (Gremote (B)) ≥ 2 ·H (p) +D (1− p||p)− 1 ≥ 1 (63)
with equality only when p = 1/2, where the second inequality results from the fact that 2 · H (p) +
D (1− p||p) decreases as p approaches 1/2, and is equal to 2 at p = 1/2.
We now decrease the minimal size of the input, n, such that when 1/2 ≤ s ≤ (1− p), the average
guesswork is smaller than the one in (51); by decreasing n, we later show that in some cases the size of
a biased key required to achieve a certain average guesswork, is significantly smaller than the size of an
unbiased key that achieves the same guesswork.
Lemma 10. When the number of users is 2H(s)·m−1, n = (1 + ǫ1) ·m · (H (s) +D (s||p)) where 1/2 ≤
s ≤ 1, and the key is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p), the average guesswork increases at rate that is equal to
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gremote (B))) = H (s) +D (s||p) . (64)
Proof. The general idea behind the proof is related to the fact that when the number of users is 2m·H(s)−1,
and the users are coupled with the 2m·H(s)−1 least likely bins, the average guesswork of any user is larger
than or equal to 2m·(·H(s)+D(s||p)) as long as n ≥ (1 + ǫ1) ·m · log (1/p); this follows from Theorem 8, the
fact that s ≤ q (bi) ≤ 1 where i ∈
{
1, . . . , 2m·H(s)−1
}
, and also because the backdoor mechanism does
not decrease the guesswork of any bin. However, here we consider the case when the input is equal to
n = (1 + ǫ1) ·m · (H (s) +D (s||p)), for which some of the assumptions above may not hold. Therefore,
we examine two cases: The case where q (bi) = s as well as s < q (bi) ≤ 1. Once we show that for both
cases the rate at which the average guesswork increases is larger than or equal to H (s) + D (s||p), we
can also show that the average guesswork across all users increases at this rate.
For q (bi) = s the size of the input supports the average guesswork, and so following along the same
lines as Theorem 10 and Theorem 11, we get that the average guesswork of these bins increases at rate
H (s) +D (s||p).
For s < q (bi) ≤ 1 the probability of a mapping to these bins is PK (bi) =−m·(H(q(bi))+D(q(bi)||p)), where
H (q (bi)) + D (q (bi) ||p) > H (s) + D (s||p). Therefore, the average guesswork of these elements has
to be larger than or equal to the case when q (bi) = s. In fact, when ǫ1 is small enough and n =
(1 + ǫ1) ·m · (H (s) +D (s||p)), the probability that there is a mapping to bin bi within the 2n inputs goes
to zero, and so the only occurrences of bi is due to the backdoor mechanism; the backdoor mechanism
achieves average guesswork that increases at rate (1 + ǫ1) ·(H (s) +D (s||p)) when the password is drawn
uniformly in accordance with Definition 23 (again, following the same lines as Theorem 11).
Remark 33. In order to show that a shorter biased key achieves the same guesswork that a longer
balanced key achieves we need to find the actual guesswork and not only the rate at which it increases.
The next lemma resolves this issue.
Now, we derive bounds for the actual average guesswork and not only for the rate at which it increases.
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Lemma 11. When the number of users is 2H(s)·m−1, 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1, and n = (1 + ǫ1)·m·(H (s) +D (s||p))
the average guesswork of the universal hash function defined in subsection II-B equations (33), (34), a
key which is i.i.d. Bernoulli(p), and an output of size m, is lower bounded by
E (Gremote (B)) ≥ (1− γ (m, p, s)) · 2m·(H(s)+D(s||p)) − e−2ǫ1·m ·
(
2m·(H(s)+D(s||p)) + 2n
)
(65)
3 where γ (s, p,m) decays exponentially to zero (i.e., limm→∞ γ (s, p,m) = 0). On the other hand,
for any universal set of hash functions, with a key that is i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2), and an output of size
(H (s) +D (s||p)) ·m, the average guesswork is equal to
E
(
G
(u)
remote (B) , f (·)
)
= 2m·(H(s)+D(s||p)) − (1− 2−m·(H(s)+D(s||p)))2n · (2m·(H(s)+D(s||p)) + 2n) . (66)
Therefore, we get that
lim
m→∞
E (Gremote (B))
E
(
G
(u)
remote (B) , f (·)
) ≥ 1.
Proof. Let us start by proving the inequality in (65). When n = (1 + ǫ1) · m · (H (s) +D (s||p)), the
probability of a bin of type q (b) > s to be mapped by the key to any password decreases according to
the expression
1− (1− 2−m·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)))2(1+ǫ1)·m·(H(s)+D(s||p)) ; (67)
this is because of the fact that when q (b) > s the term (H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p)) > (H (s) +D (s||p)).
The back door mechanism in Definition 23 plants a mapping by drawing a password uniformly. Therefore,
we get with probability (1− γ1 (s, p,m)) where γ1 (s, p,m) decays to zero exponentially fast (i.e., with
probability that approaches 1 very quickly), that when q (b) > s the problem of cracking a bin is as hard as
guessing the mapping created by the back door mechanism. Since in this case the password is uniformly
distributed over all possible passwords (i.e., 2n possibilities), it can be easily shown that the average
guesswork is equal to 2
n
2
≥ 2(H(s)+D(s||p))·m when m ≥ m0. Finally, by assigning the right parameters to
equations (35), (40) when q (b) = s, the average guesswork is lower bounded by
G (b|q (b) = s) ≥ (1− γ2 (s, p,m)) · 2(H(s)+D(s||p))·m − e−2ǫ1·m ·
(
2m·(H(s)+D(s||p)) + 2n
)
. (68)
Hence, the average guesswork over all users (or alternatively all bins for which s ≤ q (b) ≤ 1) is lower
bounded by the term in equation (65).
In the case when the key is uniform, (66) is proven by assigning the right parameters in equation (35)
and keeping in mind that when the key is uniform and f (·) is a bijection, the average guesswork is the
same for any bin. These arguments prove the equality in equation (66).
Remark 34. Note that when s = 1/2, the number of users is
∑m/2
i=1
(
m
i
)
. Thus, in this case as m increases
we get that
∑m/2
i=1 (
m
i )
2m
= 1/2. By doing so we do not allocate bins that have an average guesswork which
is smaller than the total average guesswork. Furthermore, in our analysis we restrict the size of the input,
n, to be proportional to m. However, in practice n can be much larger. This can be achieved by simply
duplicating the mappings for the first (H (s) +D (s||p)) · m inputs over and over again. By doing so
the number of inputs can increase as much as needed, whereas the size of the key and the total average
guesswork remain the same. Finally, by allocating a bin to each user and performing the back door
procedure in Definition 23, the chance of collision between any two users is the same as the chance of
collision for a strongly universal hash function with a uniform key, that has the same average guesswork,
that is, 2n.
We now show that when the average guesswork is larger than the number of users, a biased key which
3Note that the result from Theorem 11 can also be extended to a lower bound when (1− p) ≤ s ≤ 1 by arguments that follow the same
lines as Lemma 11.
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“beamforms” to the subset of users, requires a key of smaller size than an unbiased key that achieves the
same level of security.
Theorem 12. When the number of users is 2H(s)·m−1, 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1, any universal set of hash functions
for which f (·) is a bijection, requires an unbiased key ku (i.e., which is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2)) of
size
|ku| = (H (s) +D (s||p)) ·m · 2(H(s)+D(s||p))·m (69)
and output of size |mu| = (H (s) +D (s||p)) ·m, in order to achieve an average guesswork for which
lim
m→∞
E
(
G
(u)
remote (B, f (·))
)
2(H(s)+D(s||p))·m
= 1.
On the other hand when the key is drawn Bernoulli(p) the universal set of hash functions defined in
equations (33), (34), achieves the same average guesswork with a key kb of size
|kb| = m · 2(H(s)+D(s||p))·m (70)
and an output of size m. In both cases the minimal input is of size n = (1 + ǫ1) · (H (s) +D (s||p)) ·m.
The average size of the biased key can be decreased further to H (p) · |kb| through entropy encoding.
Finally, distributing passwords according to the procedure in Definition 23 requires an unbiased key of
size
(1 + ǫ1) · (H (s) +D (s||p)) ·m · 2H(s)·m. (71)
Proof. From Corollary 9 and Lemma 11 we get that when the key is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2), the
average guesswork is determined by the size of the output. Therefore, in order to achieve an average
guesswork that equals 2m·(H(s)+D(s||p)) the size of the output must be (H (s) +D (s||p)) ·m. In addition
n = (1 + ǫ1·) (H (s) +D (s||p)) and so the size of the key is equal to |ku| = (H (s) +D (s||p)) · m ·
2(1+ǫ1)·m·(H(s)+D(s||p)).
For the case when the key is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p), we get from Lemma 11 that an output of size m
achieves the desired guesswork. Hence, in this case the size of the key is |kb| = m · 2(1+ǫ1)·m·(H(s)+D(s||p))
Finally, in order to allocate bins according to the method in Definition 23 each user has a key of
size n, and since there are 2H(s)·m users the size of the key required to draw passwords is (1 + ǫ1) ·
(H (s) +D (s||p)) ·m · 2H(s)·m.
Corollary 10. When the number of users is equal to 2H(s)·m−1 and the average guesswork increases at
rate (H (s) +D (s||p)), the ratio between the size of an unbiased key and a biased key which is drawn
Bernoulli(p), when both keys achieve the average guesswork above, is
lim
m→∞
|ku|/|kb| = H (s) +D (s||p) .
Proof. The proof results from the fact that
lim
m→∞
(H (s) +D (s||p)) ·m · 2(1+ǫ1)·m·(H(s)+D(s||p))
(1 + ǫ1) · (H (s) +D (s||p)) ·m · 2H(s)·m +m · 2(1+ǫ1)·m·(H(s)+D(s||p)) = H (s) +D (s||p) .
In the next corollary we find the minimal size of a key that enables to achieve through bias, a desired
average guesswork that is larger than the number of users.
Corollary 11. When there are 2m−1 users and the desired average guesswork increases at rate α > 1,
the key of minimal size is drawn Bernoulli(p0) such that
1 +D (1/2||p0) = α. (72)
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A universal set of hash functions defined in equations (33), (34), whose output is of size m achieves the
average guesswork above.
Proof. From Corollary 9 and Lemma 11 we know that when α > 1 and the key is i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2),
the size of the output has to be α ·m in order to achieve an average guesswork 2α·m. Since in this case
the size of the input has to be larger than α ·m, the size of an unbiased key that achieves the desired
average guesswork is α ·m · 2α·m.
From Lemma 11 we also know that for any biased key that achieves average guesswork 2α·m the size
of the input has to be at least α ·m. However, the size of the output can in fact be smaller than α ·m.
Essentially, we can define the output as m′ such that number of users 2m−1 = 2H(s0)·m
′−1 and m′ < α ·m,
where 1/2 ≤ s0 ≤ 1. The size of the key in this case is equal to m′ · 2α·m. The minimal value of m′ that
still enables to allocate a different bin to each user is m′ = m (i.e., s = 1/2). In this case the size of the
key is m · 2α·m; this key is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p0) such that
1 +D (1/2||p0) = α.
Theorem 13. When the number of users M = 2m−1, a uniform key that achieves average guesswork
2m·α, where α > 1, with any mapping from the set of keys to the set of all hash functions, is α times
larger than a biased key which is i.i.d. Bernoulli(p0) that achieves the same average guesswork with the
universal set of hash functions defined in subsection II-B equations (33), (34), where p0 satisfies
1 +D (1/2||p0) = α. (73)
Proof. The proof follows directly from Corollary 10 and Corollary 11 of section IX.
Figure 12 illustrates Theorem 13.
Now, we show that biased keys also require smaller space to store the bins on the server.
Corollary 12. When the number of users is 2H(s)·m−1 and the average guesswork is equal to 2m·(H(s)+D(s||p)),
a biased key which is drawn Bernoulli(p) requires to store 2H(s)·m−1 bins of size m each, whereas an
unbiased key requires to store 2H(s)·m−1 bins of size (H (s) +D (s||p))·m. Therefore, under the constraints
above a biased key decreases the storage space by a factor of (H (s) +D (s||p)). The average stored
space can be reduced further to H (p) ·m · 2H(s)·m−1 through entropy encoding.
Proof. The proof is straight forward and results from the fact that when considering a biased key the
output is H (s) +D (s||p) times smaller than the output when the key is unbiased.
A remark is in order regarding the results above.
Remark 35. Note that the results above apply to strongly universal sets of hash functions, which are
balanced sets. On the other hand in sections X and XI we consider sets of hash functions which are
not balanced, that is, the size of a conditional set depends on the actual values of the bins on which it
is conditioned; for example, if a fraction of (1− PK (b0)) mappings is revealed such that none of these
mappings map to b0, then the remaining fraction of Pk (b0) mappings are all mapped to b0. Hence, in this
case the conditional set is of size 1.
X. PROOFS OF THE RESULTS OF SECTION VII
We first calculate the guesswork when bins are not allocated to the users, and for any bin the attacker
knows of a password that is mapped to it.
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Keyed Hash Function
k : i.i.d. Bernoulli(p); |k| = m · 2α·m
Key
n = α ·m m
Keyed Hash Function
k : i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2); |k| = α ·m · 2α·m
Key
n = α ·m α ·m
Figure 12. When the number of users is 2m−1, and the average guesswork is equal to 2α·m, the size of a biased key is α > 1 times smaller
than a uniform key, where α = 1+D (1/2||p). Note that in order to achieve an average guesswork 2α·m, the output of a strongly universal
set of hash functions has to be of size α ·m when the key is unbiased, whereas when the key is biased the output can reduce to m bits, as
long as the number of users is no larger than 2m−1.
Theorem 14 (Guesswork of a broken hash function). When each user draws his password uniformly over
(1, . . . , 2n) as in Definition 24, and for every bin the attacker knows of a password that is mapped to it,
the ρth moment of the guesswork of every user is
E ((GH (B))
ρ) ≥ 1
(1 +m · ln (2))ρ
(
2m∑
b=1
(PH (b))
1/(1+ρ)
)1+ρ
. (74)
When PH (b) is defined based on the method of types as presented in Definition 18, the ρth moment of
the guesswork increases at rate that is equal to
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E ((GH (B))
ρ)) = H1/(1+ρ) (p) (75)
where H1/(1+ρ) (p) is the Renyi entropy which is defined in equation (2).
Proof. We assume that for every bin the attacker knows of a password that is mapped to it. Therefore,
the problem of guessing a password reduces to the problem of guessing the correct bin for each user.
Since each user chooses the password uniformly over {1, . . . , 2n}, the chance of it being mapped to bin
b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} is PH (b). Hence, the problem is reduced to the guesswork problem that is analyzed in
[10]. We get the average guesswork that is stated above by following the same lines as [10] .
Remark 36. Essentially, the result of Theorem 14 captures the average time required to crack a hash
function when a key stretching mechanism [26] is used in order to protect a system against passwords
cracking. For example, when ρ = 2, it means that the time that elapses between attempts increases
quadratically.
Remark 37. When passwords are not drawn uniformly, the optimal strategy of guessing passwords one
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by one is to first calculate the probability of each bin by summing the probabilities over all passwords
that are mapped to this bin, and then guessing bins according to their probabilities in descending order.
We begin by defining a back door procedure for any hash function.
Definition 25. The back door mechanism for modifying a hash function is defined as follows.
• For each user choose a different bin according to the procedure described in Definition 19 (i.e., the
first user gets the least likely bin b1, the second user receives the second least likely bin b2, and the
2H(s)·m−1th user receives b2H(s)·m−1).
• Each of the users from the first to the 2H(s)·m−1th draws a password uniformly by drawing n bits
i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2).
• For each user, if the number that was drawn g ∈ {1, . . . , 2n} has not been drawn by any of the users
that have bins that are less likely than the current bin, then replace the mapping of g with a mapping
from g to the bin assigned to the user.
• In the case when another user who is assigned to a less likely bin, has drawn g: Do not change the
value of the mapping of g again (i.e., the mapping from g is changed only once by the user who is
coupled with the least likely bin among the bins of the users whose password is g). Instead, change
the bin allocated to the user to the least likely bin among the bins allocated to users whose password
is g. Therefore, the mapping from g is changed only once, to the least likely bin that is mapped to g.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 6.
The proof of Theorem 6. The underlying idea behind the proof is to lower bound the average guesswork
by upper bounding the probability of finding a password that cracks the bin at each round; we upper
bound the probability by incorporating the maximal number of mappings that the backdoor mechanism
can add to each bin as well as the number of unsuccessful guesses that have been made so far. We start by
proving this theorem for any PH (b)-hash function when averaged over all possible strategies of guessing
passwords one by one, and we then show this also for the set of PH (b)-hash functions and for any strategy.
Then, in order to prove the equality rather than just an upper bound, we show that the probability that the
number of mappings eliminated by the backdoor mechanism affects the fraction of mappings, is small to
the extent that does not allow the average to grow beyond the lower bound discussed above.
Since the attacker does not know the mappings of the hash function, there is no reason for it to favor
any guessing strategy over the other. Hence, we average over all strategies of guessing passwords one
by one; essentially, this is equivalent to averaging over all possible permutations of the inputs, assuming
that the permutations are uniformly distributed. This can be achieved by first drawing a random variable
uniformly over {1, . . . , 2n}, then drawing a random variable over the remaining 2n − 1 possibilities, etc.
We now wish to lower bound the average guesswork by upper bounding PH (b). In order to lower
bound the average guesswork we consider only the first (1 + ǫ1) ·m · log (1/p) guesses when averaging,
where 0 < ǫ1 < ǫ. Clearly the number of guesses can be greater than the term above and may go up to 2n.
Furthermore, we observe that after k unsuccessful guesses, the chance of guessing bin b is PH (b) · 2n2n−k
where 0 ≤ k ≤ (1− PH (b)) 2n. In addition, the back door procedure of Definition 25 can add one
mapping at most to each bin. Thus, we can upper bound the probability by
PH (b) ≤ PH (b) · 2
n + 1
2n − k = P
(k)
H (b) k ∈
{
0, . . . , 2(1+ǫ1)·m·log(1/p)
}
. (76)
Note that limm→∞ 2
(1+ǫ1)·m·log(1/p)
(1−PH (b))2n = 0 since ǫ1 < ǫ.
The average guesswork of each bin can be lower bounded by
E (Gbin (b)) ≥ PH (b) ·
(
1 +
2m0−1∑
i=1
(i+ 1) ·
i∏
j=1
(
1− P (j)H (b)
))
≥ PH (b)·
2m0−1∑
i=0
(i+ 1)·
(
1− P (2m0 )H (b)
)i
(77)
39
where m0 = (1 + ǫ1) ·m · log (1/p); the first inequality is due to equation (76), whereas the second one
is because of the fact that P (2
m0 )
H (b) ≥ P (i)H (b) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , 2m0 − 1}. Hence, we get
E (Gbin (b)) ≥ PH (b)
P
(2m0 )
H (b)
·
(
1/P
(2m0 )
H (b)−
(
1− P (2m0 )H (b)
)2m0
·
(
1/P
(2m0 )
H (b) + 2
m0
))
. (78)
Now, let us break equation (78) down. First, we know that
P
(2m0 )
H (b) =
PH (b) · 2(1+ǫ)·m·log(1/p) + 1
2(1+ǫ)·m·log(1/p) − 2(1+ǫ1)·m·log(1/p) =
PH (b) + 2
−(1+ǫ)·m·log(1/p)
1− 2−(ǫ−ǫ1)·log(1/p)·m (79)
In addition, since PH (b) ≥ 2−m·log(1/p) for any b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} we get
PH (b) ≤ P (2
m0 )
H (b) ≤ PH (b) ·
1 + 2−ǫ·log(1/p)·m
1− 2−(ǫ−ǫ1)·log(1/p)·m ∀b ∈ {1, . . . , 2
m} . (80)
From Corollary 7 we get that
lim
m→∞
(
1− P (2m0 )H (b)
)2m0
·
(
1/P
(2m0 )
H (b) + 2
m0
)
= 0. (81)
Further,
1/P
(2m0 )
H (b) ≥ 1/PH (b) ·
1− 2−(ǫ−ǫ1)·log(1/p)·m
1 + 2−ǫ·log(1/p)·m
∀b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} (82)
Hence, by averaging over all the types of the assigned bins similarly to what is done in Theorem 10 we
get the inequality
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gremote (B))) ≥
{
H (s) +D (s||p) (1− p) ≤ s ≤ 1
2 ·H (p) +D (1− p||p)−H (s) 1/2 ≤ s ≤ (1− p) . (83)
The equality is achieved based on the following arguments. Assume that the backdoor mechanism
eliminates l mappings to bin b. In order for the inequality in (83) to turn to equality, l has to increase
at a rate that is smaller than 2n · PH (b). Therefore, since there are 2H(s)·m−1 users, whenever n ≥
(1 + ǫ) · (log (1/p) +H (s)), l cannot affect the rate at which 2n · PH (b) increases.
Furthermore, this theorem also applies to the case when averaging over the PH (b)-set of hash functions
for any strategy of guessing passwords one by one (i.e., for any fixed strategy, the average is performed
over the set of hash functions). This is due to the fact that any PH (b)-hash function can be represented
by a bipartite graph (e.g., Figure 9) for which averaging over the order according to which nodes that
represent the domain, are chosen while keeping the edges fixed, leads to the same result as averaging
over the order of the edges connected to these nodes while choosing the nodes in any order. The effect
of the backdoor procedure given in Definition 25 is similar. When considering a user who is mapped to
bin b ∈ B, the other users can only decrease the number of mappings to this bin. Based on the arguments
presented in this proof, the other users cannot increase the average guesswork. Furthermore, the user can
add up to one mapping, which does not affect the average guesswork.
The proof of Corollary 4. The proof is straightforward based on the proof of Theorem 6.
Next, we prove Theorem 7.
The proof of Theorem 7. We are interested in upper bounding the probability
Pr
(
Gbin (b) ≤ 2(1−ǫ1)·(H(s)+D(s||p))·m
)
= P
(0)
H (b) +
2(1−ǫ1)·(H(s)+D(s||p))·m∑
i=1
P
(i)
H (b) ·
i−1∏
j=0
(
1− P (j)H (b)
)
(84)
where
P
(i)
H (b) =
PH (b) · 2n + 1
2n − i . (85)
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As PH (b) < P
(0)
H (b) < · · · < P (2
m1 )
H (b) where m1 = (1− ǫ1) · (H (s) +D (s||p)) · m, we can upper
bound the expression in (84) by
Pr
(
Gbin (b) ≤ 2(1−ǫ1)·(H(s)+D(s||p))·m
) ≤ 2m1−1∑
i=0
P
(2m1 )
H (b)·(1− PH (b))i =
P
(2m1 )
H
PH (b)
·
(
1− (1− PH (b))2
m1
)
.
(86)
Following along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 6 we know that the ratio limm→∞
P
(2m1 )
H
PH (b)
= 1,
and because of the fact that PH (b) ≤ 2−(H(s)+D(s||p))·m for any b ∈ B we get
lim
m→∞
1− (1− PH (b))2
(1−ǫ1)·(H(s)+D(s||p))·m ≤ lim
m→∞
1− (1− 2−(H(s)+D(s||p))·m)2(1−ǫ)·(H(s)+D(s||p))·m = 0 (87)
for any b ∈ B.
Note that the result above also applies to the case when
Pr
(
Gbin (b) ≤ 2(1−ǫ1)·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p))·m
) ≤ lim
m→∞
1− (1− PH (b))2
(1−ǫ1)·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p))·m
= 0 (88)
This result also applies to the case when averaging over the PH (b)-set of hash functions and considering
any strategy of guessing passwords one by one. It results from the same arguments that are given in
Theorem 6; the backdoor mechanism can add no more than one mapping which is drawn uniformly over
the set of passwords. Therefore, the same bounds and arguments hold for this case as well. This concludes
the proof.
The proof of Corollary 6. The proof of this corollary relies on the concentration property of the average
guesswork of every bin presented in the proof of Theorem 7, along with the fact that the rate at which
the average guesswork of a password increases is dominated by elements of type
√
θ√
θ+
√
1−θ [14].
We consider the case where n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m · (log (1/p) +H (s)) as for this case the average guesswork
of bin b cannot increase due to mappings that are removed by other users (for more details see the proof
of Theorem 6).
We denote the average guesswork of bin b ∈ B when averaged over the PH (b)-set of hash functions
by G(H) (b). From equation (82) along with the fact that n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m · (log (1/p) +H (s)), we know
that
lim
m→∞
1
m
log
(
E
(
G(H) (b)
))
= H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p) . (89)
Furthermore, let us denote the average guesswork of a password that is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(θ) by
G(ps) (θ) whose rate is [10]
lim
n→∞
1
n
E
(
G(ps) (θ)
)
= H1/2 (θ) . (90)
The average guesswork of bin b ∈ B is upper bounded by
(E (Gbin (b))) ≤ min
(
E
(
G(H) (b)
)
, E
(
G(ps) (θ)
))
(91)
because of the fact that the guesswork Gbin (b) = min
(
G(H) (b) , G(ps) (θ)
)
.
We begin be considering the case when limm→∞ 2· nmH
( √
θ√
θ+
√
1−θ
)
≤ (1− ǫ2)·(H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p))
for any 0 < ǫ2 < 1. We wish to show that in this case the rate at which the average guesswork increases
is equal to limm→∞ nmH1/2 (θ). First, note that
Pr
(
Gbin (b) = i|G(H) (b) ≥ 2(1−ǫ2)·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p))·m
)
= Pr
(
G(ps) (θ) = i
)
(92)
when i ∈ {0, . . . , 2(1−ǫ2)·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p))·m} because G(H) (b) and G(ps) (θ) are independent as well as
Gbin (b) = min
(
G(H) (b) , G(ps) (θ)
)
. In [14] it was shown based on large deviation arguments that the rate
at which the average guesswork of a password that is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(θ) increases is dominated by
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elements of type
√
θ√
θ+
√
1−θ ; and when guessing passwords according to their probabilities in descending
order the number of guesses that include all elements of this type increases like 2
2·n·H
( √
θ√
θ+
√
1−θ
)
. Hence,
based on this fact and (92) we get that the rate at which the conditional average guesswork increases is
lower bounded by
lim
m→∞
1
m
log
(
E
(
Gbin
(
b|G(H) (b) ≥ 2(1−ǫ2)·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p))·m))) ≥ n
m
H1/2 (θ) (93)
when limm→∞ 2 · nmH
( √
θ√
θ+
√
1−θ
)
≤ (1− ǫ2) · (H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p)). In addition, we know from
equation (88) that
lim
m→∞
1
m
log
(
Pr
(
G(H) (b) ≥ 2(1−ǫ2)·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p))·m)) = 0 (94)
Therefore, we can lower bound the rate at which the average guesswork of bin b increases by
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gbin (b))) ≥ 1
m
log
(
E
(
Gbin
(
b|G(H) (b) ≥ 2(1−ǫ2)·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p)))))×
Pr
(
G(H) (b) ≥ 2(1−ǫ2)·(H(q(b))+D(q(b)||p))) ≥ n
m
H1/2 (θ) . (95)
Hence, based on (91) and (95) we get
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gbin (b))) =
n
m
H1/2 (θ) . (96)
Next we wish to find the average guesswork when H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p) ≤ (1− ǫ2) · nmH (θ) for any
0 < ǫ2 < 1. We wish to show that in this case the rate at which the average guesswork increases is equal
to H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p). First, note that
Pr
(
Gbin (b) = i|G(ps) (θ) > 2(1−ǫ2)·(H(θ))·n
)
= Pr
(
G(H) (b) = i
)
(97)
when i ∈ {0, . . . , 2(1−ǫ2)·(H(θ))·n} because G(H) (b) and G(ps) (θ) are independent as well as Gbin (b) =
min
(
G(H) (b) , G(ps) (θ)
)
. Based on equation (88) it can be easily shown that the average guesswork of
the PH (b)-set of hash functions is concentrated around its mean value. Hence, based on this fact and (97)
we get that the rate at which the conditional average guesswork increases is lower bounded by
lim
m→∞
1
m
log
(
E
(
Gbin
(
b|G(ps) (θ) ≥ 2(1−ǫ2)·H(θ)·n))) ≥ H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p) (98)
when H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p) ≤ (1− ǫ2) · nmH (θ). In addition
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
(
Pr
(
G(ps) (θ) ≥ 2(1−ǫ2)·H(θ)·n)) = 0. (99)
Therefore, we can lower bound the rate at which the average guesswork of bin b increases by
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gbin (b))) ≥ 1
m
log
(
E
(
Gbin
(
b|G(ps) (θ) ≥ 2(1−ǫ2)·H(θ)·n)))×
Pr
(
G(ps) (θ) ≥ 2(1−ǫ2)·H(θ)·n) ≥ H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p) . (100)
Hence, based on (91) and (100) we get
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (Gbin (b))) = H (q (b)) +D (q (b) ||p) . (101)
Equations (31) and (32) follow in a straightforward fashion when either 2
n·H
( √
θ√
θ+
√
1−θ
)
is smaller than
the minimal average guesswork, that is, smaller than 2m·(H(s)+D(s||p)); or when n
m
·H (θ) is larger than the
42
maximal rate at which the average guesswork increases (i.e., larger than log (1/p)).
We now prove Corollary 5.
The proof of Corollary 5. In order to calculate the average guesswork for guessing a password that is
mapped to any bin that is allocated to any user, we first need to bound the probability PB which is the
probability of guessing such a password in the first guess (i.e., the fraction of mappings to any of those
bins). Since PB is the probability of guessing a password that is mapped to any of the assigned bins, we
get
PB =
∑
b∈B
PH (b) (102)
where B is the set of assigned bins as in Definition 19. Therefore, based on Lemma 1, Lemma 2, the
fact that there are m types, and the fact that the number of users M = 2H(s)·m−1 < 2H(s)·m as well as the
fact that max1/2≤s≤q≤1D (q||p) = D (s||p) when p ≤ 1/2; PB can be bounded by
1
(m+ 1)2
· 2−m·D(s||p) ≤ PB ≤ m · 2−m·D(s||p). (103)
Next, similarly to the proof of Theorem 6 equation (76) we can further bound the probability of success
after k unsuccessful guesses by
PB ≤ P (k)B ≤
PB · 2n +m · 2m·H(s)
2n − k (104)
where P (k)B is the probability of guessing a password that is mapped to any b ∈ B, after k unsuccessful
guesses; and m · 2m·H(s) takes into consideration the fact that the backdoor mechanism from Definition
25 may add a mapping to each bin. Similarly to (77) we can lower bound the guesswork by
E (Ginsider (B)) ≥ PB ·
2m0−1∑
i=0
(i+ 1) ·
(
1− P (2m0 )B
)i
. (105)
where m0 = (1 + ǫ1) ·m · log (1/p), 0 < ǫ1 < ǫ. Since
P
(2m0 )
B ≤ PB
1 + (m+ 1)2 ·m · 2−ǫ·log(1/p)·m
1− 2−m·log(1/p)·(ǫ−ǫ1) . (106)
Hence, for the exact same arguments as the ones in Theorem 6 we can state that
lim
m→∞
1
m
log (E (GAny (b ∈ B))) ≥ lim
m→∞
1
m
log (1/PB) = D (s||p) . (107)
The equality is achieved based on similar arguments to the ones provided in the proof of Theorem 6;
the number of mappings that other users remove in the backdoor mechanism is negligible. Furthermore,
these results also apply to the case when averaging over the PH (b)-set of hash functions and considering
any strategy of guessing passwords one by one. It results from the same arguments that are given in
Theorem 6; each user in B can add no more than one mapping, and the total number of mappings does
not affect the average guesswork, as shown in equation (107).
XI. PROOFS OF THE RESULTS OF SECTIONS V AND VI
In order to upper bound the rate at which the average guesswork increases we consider the case where
all users are mapped to the 2H(s)·m−1 most likely bins. This in turn enables us to give an upper bound
to the average guesswork by considering the results for the case of bins allocation. The lower bound is
derived by assuming that the users are mapped to the 2H(s)·m−1 most likely bins.
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We begin by proving Theorem 5.
proof of Theorem 5. This result follows directly from equation (82) which lower bounds the probability
when bins are allocated, by using the probability when there is no bins allocation.
Next, we prove Theorem 3
proof of Theorem 3. The upper bound follows directly from Corollary 5 as the average guesswork with
bins allocation is equal to the result when considering the most likely bins.
The lower bound is based on the assumption that the users are mapped to the 2H(s)·m−1 most likely
bins. This leads to the following optimization problem
min
0≤q≤1−s
D (q||p) (108)
where 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1. The minimal value is achieved at q = p ≤ 1/2, and is equal to 0. Therefore, the
lower bound is equal to {
D (1− s||p) 0 ≤ 1− s ≤ p
0 p ≤ 1− s ≤ 1/2 . (109)
Finally, because there is no backdoor procedure that modify the hash function, the results hold for n ≥
(1 + ǫ) ·m · log 1/p. This concludes the proof.
We now prove Corollary 1.
proof of Corollary 1. We begin by proving that when 0 ≤ 1−s < q ≤ p the probability that all passwords
are mapped to bins of type q is e−2
m·(2·H(1−s)−H(q)) × 2−m·D(q||p)·2H(1−s)·m . Since each password is drawn
Bernoulli(1/2) and PH (b) defined based on the method of types as presented in Definition 18, the
probability that a password is mapped to a certain bin of type q is 2−m·(H(q)+D(q||p)). Since there are
2m·H(s) users, the probability that all users are mapped to a certain set of bins in which all bins are
of type q is 2−m·2
m·H(1−s)·(H(q)+D(q||p)). The number of combinations in which the users are mapped to
different bins of type q is 2
m·H(q)!
(2m·H(q)−2m·H(1−s))! . According to Sterling’s approximation, when m≫ 1
2m·H(q)! ∼ 2
m·H(q)·2m·H(q)
e2m·H(q)
(110)
whereas for m≫ 1(
2m·H(q) − 2m·H(1−s))! ∼ 2m·H(q)·(2m·H(q)−2m·H(1−s)) × e2m·(2·H(1−s)−H(q))−2m·H(q). (111)
The ratio of the two equations above increases like
2m·H(q)·2
m·H(1−s) × e−2m·(2·H(1−s)−H(q)). (112)
Therefore, the probability that all passwords are mapped to different bins of type q is equal to
2−m·2
m·H(1−s)·(H(q)+D(q||p))×2m·H(q)·2m·H(1−s) × e−2m·(2·H(1−s)−H(q)) = e−2m·(2·H(1−s)−H(q)) ×2−m·D(q||p)·2H(1−s)·m .
(113)
Furthermore the smallest rate at which the probability decreases is achieved when q = p and is equal to
e−2
m·(2·H(1−s)−H(p))
. (114)
Based on arguments similar to the ones in Theorem 3 we get that when all users are mapped to bins of
type q the probability of finding a password that is mapped to any of the bins is 2−m(H(q)+D(q||p)−H(1−s))
and therefore the average guesswork increases like 2m(H(q)+D(q||p)−H(1−s)). In the case when q = p we get
that the average guesswork increase like 2m(H(p)−H(1−s))
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Finally, when q < 1 − s ≤ 1/2 the most probable event is when all passwords are mapped to bins of
type p in which case the average guesswork does not increase exponentially, that is, the rate at which it
increases is equal to zero.
Next, we now prove Corollary 2.
proof of Corollary 2. The probability that the users are mapped to a particular type q follows along the
same lines as the proof of Corollary 1. When all users are mapped to bins of type q, the probability
of guessing a password that is mapped to a bin of a user is the same across users and is equal to
2−m·(H(q)+D(q||p)), and therefore the average guesswork is equal to 2m·(H(q)+D(q||p)).
Finally, we prove Theorem 4.
proof of Theorem 4. The upper bound follows directly from Theorem 6 as the average guesswork with
bins allocation is equal to the result of averaging across the most likely bins. Because there is no backdoor
procedure that modify the hash function, the results hold for n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m · log 1/p.
The lower bound is based on the assumption that the users are mapped to the 2H(s)·m−1 most likely
bins. By arguments similar to Theorem 10 we arrive at the following optimization problem
max
0≤q≤1−s
2 ·H (q) +D (q||p) (115)
where 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1. In lemma 8 it is shown that 2 ·H (q)+D (q||p) is a concave function whose maximal
value is at q = 1 − p ≥ 1/2. Hence, when 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 − s ≤ 1/2 the maximal value is achieved for
q = 1 − s and is equal to 2 · H (1− s) + D (1− s||p) = 2 · H (s) + D (1− s||p). This concludes the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is along the same lines as Theorem 6 equations (76)-(82).
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is along the same lines as Theorem 6 equations (76)-(82).
Proof of Corollary 3. When n ≥ (1 + ǫ) ·m · log (1/p) the proof follows along the same line as Corollary
8
XII. SUMMARY
In this work we define and derive the average guesswork for hash functions. We define the conditional
average guesswork as a function of the set of occupied bins. We also find the most likely conditional
average guesswork as well as the maximum and minimum conditional average guesswork. We reveal an
interesting connection between the effect of bias and the number of users on the level of security, and
quantify the average guesswork of hash functions by using basic information theoretic measures.
Furthermore, we show that when the hash function can be modified by a backdoor mechanism, bias
can increase the average guesswork unboundedly.
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